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[1273] 
Symmetric Constitutionalism:  
An Essay on Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Post-
Kennedy Supreme Court 
ZACHARY S. PRICE† 
Following Justice Kennedy’s retirement and the bitter fight over Justice Kavanaugh’s 
confirmation, increasingly polarized views about constitutional law in general, and specific 
constitutional cases in particular, threaten to undermine courts’ legitimacy, degrade their 
institutional capacity, and weaken public support for important civil liberties. 
To help mitigate these risks, this Essay proposes that judges subscribe to an ethos of “symmetric 
constitutionalism.” Within the limits of controlling considerations of text, structure, history, 
precedent, and practice, courts in our polarized era should lean towards outcomes, doctrines, 
and rationales that confer valuable protections across both sides of the nation’s major political 
divides, and away from those that frame constitutional law as a matter of zero-sum competition 
between competing partisan visions. In other words, courts should aspire to craft a 
constitutional law with cross-partisan appeal, avoiding when possible interpretations that favor 
one ideological position without possible benefit to others. 
Reflecting on several cases from Justice Kennedy’s last term, including Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, this Essay explores what subscribing to such an 
ethos might mean in practice. It also considers what critical purchase a preference for symmetry 
might offer in several controversial areas, including freedom of expression, structural 
constitutional law, equal protection, gun rights, and substantive due process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We live in a polarized era, in which mutual suspicions and animosities 
increasingly define our politics. In such a period, constitutional law can take two 
forms: a continuation of political conflict by other means, in which Supreme 
Court decisions mop up the defeated remnants of a losing coalition, or a search 
for neutral principles of civil liberty that may be mutually reinforcing across the 
nation’s political divides. Using as examples the Supreme Court’s recent 
Masterpiece Cakeshop decision and other cases from the pivotal 2017–2018 
term—which turned out to be the last for erstwhile “swing” Justice Anthony 
Kennedy—this Essay makes the case for the latter approach. 
More concretely, the Essay argues that courts should practice “symmetric 
constitutionalism.” Insofar as the governing legal materials of text, structure, 
precedent, and history leave room for judicial discretion, courts in a polarized 
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period should lean towards outcomes, doctrines, and rationales that confer 
valuable protections across both sides of the Nation’s major political divides, 
and away from those that frame constitutional law as a matter of zero-sum 
competition between competing partisan visions. In other words, courts should 
aspire to craft a constitutional law with cross-partisan appeal, avoiding when 
possible interpretations that favor one ideological position without possible 
benefit to others. 
From this point of view, the First Amendment rule requiring content-
neutrality in speech regulation is paradigmatically symmetric: it protects all 
speakers, no matter what they are saying. Trans-substantive procedural due 
process is likewise inherently symmetric: it grants equivalent protections to all 
claimants and defendants. By contrast, the holding in District of Columbia v. 
Heller that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms is 
paradigmatically asymmetric: whether it is ultimately right or wrong, the 
decision attempted to resolve a contested political issue in one side’s favor.1 So 
too are some substantive due process holdings, though (for reasons I’ll come 
back to) often only when viewed in isolation. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, which 
involved a baker’s refusal on religious grounds to create a custom cake for a 
same-sex marriage, the Court could have framed the dispute as an expressive 
freedom case or a religious liberty case.2 In choosing the latter approach, the 
Court favored an asymmetric doctrine—one that at present principally benefits 
members of the conservative coalition. By contrast, a free-expression rationale 
would have been more symmetric: it could have applied even-handedly over a 
broader set of disputes. Precisely what positions are asymmetric in the sense I 
discuss here is contingent upon existing partisan configurations and so may 
change over time. At all times, however, when confronting questions implicating 
sharp ideological divides, symmetric constitutionalism should encourage judges 
to mitigate doctrinal asymmetry to the extent possible. 
To be clear at the outset, symmetric constitutionalism, so understood, is not 
a primary consideration of interpretive theory, but instead an ethos or 
disposition. It is a thumb on the scale that judges subscribing to different primary 
interpretive approaches may equally incorporate. In American constitutional 
law, arguments based on text, structure, precedent, and history properly control 
the analysis, though fierce battles rage over how best to conduct the inquiry 
when these considerations conflict or prove indeterminate. Apart from such 
primary considerations of interpretive theory, however, scholars have long 
advocated organizing judicial review around certain secondary dispositions. A 
century ago, James Bradley Thayer advocated an ethos of judicial restraint: 
courts, he argued, should defer to outcomes of the democratic process unless the 
 
 1. 554 U.S. 570, 575 (2008). 
 2. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018). 
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Constitution clearly required a different result.3 Similarly, Cass Sunstein, among 
others, has advocated an ethos of “judicial minimalism” under which courts 
proceed with caution, deciding no more than necessary in each case and 
employing the narrowest possible rationale.4 
Symmetric constitutionalism is another organizing mindset of this sort, and 
indeed one that judges going back at least to John Marshall have sometimes 
exhibited. Just as an opinion, decision, or doctrine can be more or less Thayerian 
or more or less minimalist, it can also be more or less symmetric. By the same 
token, though, just as judges subscribing to different primary interpretive 
theories may be more or less Thayerian or minimalist in practice, so too may 
judges with varying primary interpretive commitments lean more or less sharply 
in favor of symmetry. As compared to these competing dispositions, however, 
symmetric constitutionalism is the appropriate ethos for our time. In particular, 
although some have advocated minimalism as a response to polarization,5 the 
truth is that broader doctrines, holdings, and rationales may often be preferable 
today, precisely because greater breadth may enable greater symmetry. 
Amid intense partisanship and deep political divisions over particular case 
outcomes, an orientation towards bipartisan symmetry may give force to notions 
of mutual toleration and broadly shared equal citizenship that ultimately underlie 
our system of constitutional self-governance. What is more, by seeking cross-
partisan distribution of constitutional law’s benefits, symmetric 
constitutionalism may respond to the central political-process risk facing our 
constitutional order: the danger that tribal factionalism will degrade and destroy 
institutional structures and shared fundamental commitments. By creating 
beneficiaries across political divides, symmetric conceptions of civil liberty at 
least stand a chance of becoming mutually reinforcing: they may encourage each 
side to view the other’s freedoms as a reflection of its own. By the same token, 
activating such political dynamics might help relieve political pressure on 
courts, limiting the risk that one-sided attacks on the judiciary become a focus 
of political action. 
As I will explain in due course, a preference for symmetry can operate at 
several relevant levels of generality.6 Achieving symmetry at any level will not 
always be possible; the Constitution is not neutral between all possible 
ideological outcomes. Yet just as courts often must expend political capital and 
invite political challenges to strike down democratically enacted laws, so, too, 
in a polarized era, will courts often consume accumulated legitimacy by reaching 
 
 3. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. 
REV. 129, 144 (1893). For a more recent argument to similar effect, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006). 
 4. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONAE 67 (2015); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: 
JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME]. 
 5. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, The Coming Constitutional Yo-Yo? Elite Opinion, Polarization, and the 
Direction of Judicial Decision Making, 56 HOW. L.J. 661, 666 (2013). 
 6. See infra Part II. 
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asymmetric results. Courts should accordingly strive to avoid such results by 
favoring symmetric theories, doctrines, and rationales when possible. 
As evidence of symmetry’s importance in our moment, the Court’s most 
recent term included several cases, particularly the widely followed Masterpiece 
Cakeshop litigation, that raised problems of constitutional symmetry. In several 
opinions, in fact, the Justices stumbled towards recognizing symmetry’s value. 
In Masterpiece Cakeshop itself, which involved a conflict between the generally 
progressive cause of same-sex marriage and the generally conservative cause of 
religious liberty, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion highlighted the importance 
of both gay rights and religious freedom (before coming down in favor of the 
latter).7 In another case, dissenters associated ideological “evenhandedness” 
with the rule of law, implicitly accusing the majority of factional bias.8 And in a 
third example, the dissent accused the majority of “weaponizing” the First 
Amendment by employing it to reach a result with strong partisan valence.9 
These stray arguments, however, were undeveloped. In fact, at present, 
courts and commentators lack any adequate vocabulary or theoretical 
perspective for addressing problems of partisan asymmetry in constitutional law. 
But if we lack such tools, we had better acquire them fast. By virtue of Justice 
Kennedy’s politically idiosyncratic legal views—favoring rights to abortion and 
same-sex marriage on the one hand and rights to gun ownership and corporate 
political speech on the other—a Supreme Court with Kennedy as the median 
Justice was functionally symmetric at the level of overall case outcomes. With 
his retirement and replacement by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the Court threatens 
to lurch right—yet many progressives, embittered not only by the Court’s 
rightward trajectory but also by the Senate’s confirmation of Kavanaugh 
following allegations of sexual assault, are threatening to respond at the next 
opportunity with court-packing or other bare-knuckle measures. As a point of 
orientation and a new vocabulary of critique, symmetric constitutionalism might 
help judges and justices weather these stormy seas with less damage to either 
their own institutional authority or the country’s shared commitments to civil 
liberty. 
My argument for this view proceeds as follows. I begin in Part I by 
elaborating the concept of symmetric constitutionalism, sketching the political 
context in which constitutional law today operates, and attempting to link 
symmetric constitutionalism to multiple legitimating considerations in 
constitutional law. Part I also responds to some possible objections and 
competing points of view. Part II explores the symmetry principle’s implications 
at different levels of generality in constitutional analysis. It starts with some 
 
 7. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723. 
 8. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2385 (2018) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 9. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501–02 (2018) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting). 
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reflections on general interpretive theory and then turns to several specific cases 
from the last Supreme Court term in which debates over bipartisan symmetry 
bubbled to the surface. Part II closes by widening the aperture to consider what 
perspective symmetric constitutionalism might offer on five major areas of 
current constitutional controversy: free expression; equal protection; structural 
questions; gun rights; and substantive due process. The Essay concludes by 
briefly recapitulating my key points and encouraging judges to resist the 
increasing pull of partisan factionalism. 
I.  SYMMETRY EXPLAINED 
Symmetric constitutionalism, again, is a judicial ethos in which courts, 
when possible, favor outcomes, doctrines, and rationales that distribute benefits 
across the country’s major ideological divides. It seeks to orient constitutional 
decision-making towards achieving bipartisan appeal (or at least acceptance) 
and away from zero-sum competition between partisan understandings. Being 
only an ethos akin to Thayerian restraint and judicial minimalism, symmetric 
constitutionalism is not a primary interpretive theory; it need not be decisive in 
any given case. But neither is symmetry simply a matter of pleasing the median 
voter: free speech doctrine, for example, is counter-majoritarian in every specific 
application (and might well be unpopular if put to a vote), but is symmetric 
insofar as it protects competing ideological viewpoints across the political 
spectrum.  
I will turn in Part II to concrete examples. Here, I lay groundwork for that 
analysis by sketching, in Subpart I.A, the political context in which federal 
constitutional law today operates and then, in Subpart I.B, linking symmetric 
constitutionalism to two major legitimating considerations, political process 
theory and historical tradition. Subpart I.C responds to several competing 
perspectives on the appropriate judicial response to political polarization. 
A.  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW’S CHALLENGES IN A POLARIZED ERA 
Constitutional law today must operate in an environment of acute political 
polarization, particularly among legal and political elites. Americans are 
increasingly divided along partisan lines (even when they report no specific 
party affiliation), and these partisan identities are increasingly tribal and 
negative, meaning they are often defined as much by visceral opposition to the 
other side as by any affirmative policy platform. At the same time, geographic 
sorting, along with social media technology, increasingly enables citizens to 
inhabit communities of the like-minded, with limited exposure to competing 
viewpoints. 
This rather bleak picture is abundantly documented by polling data and 
political science. The Pew Research Center reports, for example, that Americans 
in 2017 were more sharply divided than at any point since the poll began in 
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199410 and that roughly half of each side’s partisans (and higher proportions 
among those most engaged) report that the other side makes them “afraid.”11 
Still more alarmingly, another recent survey found that some “15 percent of 
Republicans and 20 percent of Democrats agreed that the country would be 
better off if large numbers of opposing partisans in the public today ‘just 
died.’”12 Reflecting these trends in the electorate, partisan voting patterns in both 
the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate are more polarized today than at 
any point since the late nineteenth century.13 
Some evidence suggests, furthermore, that partisan affiliations are 
increasingly hardening into social identities aligned with other key features of 
individuals’ self-understanding.14 According to political scientist Lilliana 
Mason, partisanship is becoming a “mega-identity” combining features of 
religion, race, gender, class, geography, and culture along with party affiliation, 
often resulting in “bias and even prejudice” toward partisan opponents.15 Legal 
scholar Jamal Greene likewise observes that our politics are increasingly 
“Schmittian” (in the sense associated with Weimar theorist and eventual Nazi 
Carl Schmitt): to a greater and greater degree, “the project of each side is not to 
negotiate towards a policy outcome everyone can live with; it is to dominate, 
marginalize, and kneecap the other side.”16 
The key point here is that these divisions extend not only to policy 
prescriptions and political behavior, but also to constitutional understandings 
and public perceptions of judicial rulings. For one thing, almost all salient 
constitutional cases carry some political valence in their immediate context, 
even if the principles at stake have broader application, and which partisan team 
wins or loses in that immediate context appears to increasingly shape 
 
 10. PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE PARTISAN DIVIDE ON POLITICAL VALUES GROWS EVEN WIDER 3–4 (2017), 
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/10/05162647/10-05-2017-Political-landscape-
release.pdf. 
 11. PEW RESEARCH CTR., PARTISANSHIP AND POLITICAL ANIMOSITY IN 2016, at 54 (2016), 
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2016/06/06-22-16-Partisanship-and-animosity-
release.pdf. 
 12. Nathan P. Kalmoe & Lilliana Mason, Lethal Mass Partisanship: Prevalence, Correlates, & Electoral 
Contingencies 22 (draft paper prepared for the American Political Science Association’s 2019 Annual Meeting) 
(on file with the Hastings Law Journal). 
 13. NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 25–
35 (2d ed. 2016). 
 14. See, e.g., ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE GREAT ALIGNMENT: RACE, PARTY TRANSFORMATION, AND THE 
RISE OF DONALD TRUMP 8–9 (2018). 
 15. LILLIANA MASON, UNCIVIL AGREEMENT: HOW POLITICS BECAME OUR IDENTITY 14, 23 (2018); see 
also Geoffrey C. Layman et al., Activists and Conflict Extension in American Party Politics, 104 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 324, 325 (2010) (offering an empirical and theoretical account of partisan polarization through “extension” 
of issue conflicts). 
 16. Jamal Greene, Trump as a Constitutional Failure, 93 IND. L.J. 93, 99–100, 103 (2018). Morris Fiorina 
has argued that this partisan dynamic is more a function of partisan “sorting” than polarization of opinion in the 
electorate at large, but Fiorina nonetheless acknowledges that “party sorting has raised the stakes of politics,” 
leading to greater partisan animosity and “emotional involvement.” MORRIS P. FIORINA, UNSTABLE MAJORITIES: 
POLARIZATION, PARTY SORTING & POLITICAL STALEMATE 44, 58, 77–78 (2017). 
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perceptions of whether the decision was legally correct.17 In addition, the two 
major partisan camps seem increasingly committed to conflicting visions of 
constitutional civil liberty. Progressives today typically embrace a constitutional 
vision centered on advancing social justice, protecting sexual and reproductive 
autonomy, and enabling expert administrative governance. Conservatives, in 
contrast, typically focus on protecting historic understandings of individual 
rights (including gun rights and religious freedom), leaving moral questions to 
the political process, and restoring a traditional view of separation of powers. 
Through both these vectors of conflict—result-oriented perceptions of cases and 
broader conflict between competing constitutional visions—tribal politics 
threaten to infect constitutional decision-making and complicate courts’ 
capacity to resolve legal and constitutional questions for the polity.18 
B.  NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS FOR SYMMETRIC CONSTITUTIONALISM 
My central claim here is that symmetric constitutionalism—defined, again, 
as a conscious tilt towards outcomes, doctrines, and rationales that distribute 
constitutional law’s benefits across major ideological divisions—is an 
appropriate and even necessary judicial ethos in the era of partisan polarization 
and distrust I just described. The reasons are partly practical. Decisions and 
doctrines seem more likely to prove durable in our polarized era if they can claim 
bipartisan rather than one-sided support.19 On a normative level, furthermore, a 
spirit of bipartisan generosity—a willingness to apply the law without regard to 
persons or parties—is an inherent and obvious feature of the judge’s role-
morality within our system. Judges are not (or at least should not be) result-
driven partisans; their function is to apply legal principles without fear or favor. 
Principled judges therefore routinely check their intuitions in hard cases by 
 
 17. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE PUBLIC, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 21, 
84 (2018), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2018/04/26140617/4-26-2018-Democracy-
release.pdf (discussing polling evidence that “[m]ost Republicans viewed the Supreme Court unfavorably after 
its decisions on the Affordable Care Act and same-sex marriage in summer 2015” and that Republicans and 
Democrats hold differing views as to whether “the U.S. Supreme Court should make its rulings based on what 
the Constitution ‘means in current times,’” or based on “what the Constitution ‘meant as originally written’”); 
Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1715, 
1751 (2016) (“Nowadays, the President can often count on support—or at least silence—from like-minded 
attorneys, legal academics, and other expert commentators. . . . Law, I fear, is increasingly seen as simply 
another move in a partisan game—a raw extension of politics with less persuasive force of its own.”). 
 18. For an account of how the Court developed two “clear ideological blocs” aligned with partisan divides, 
see Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the Supreme Court into a 
Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 301. 
 19. Thomas Keck has similarly suggested that the public may broadly support a robust judicial role “[s]o 
long as the set of constitutional principles being enforced is not overly derivative of a particular partisan 
platform.” Thomas M. Keck, Party Politics or Judicial Independence? The Regime Politics Literature Hits the 
Law Schools, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 511, 540 (2007); cf. Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 
86 DUKE L.J. 959, 963 (2008) (arguing that maintaining the rule of law requires a form of “judicial 
statesmanship” in which judges seek to “sustain[] social solidarity amidst reasonable, irreconcilable 
disagreement” while also “expressing social values as social circumstances change”). 
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imagining a parallel case with opposite political valence. This simple and 
intuitive exercise, performed daily by judges in oral arguments and professors 
in law school classes, carries at least the germ of symmetric constitutionalism.20 
Yet a more explicit ethos of symmetric constitutionalism can also draw 
support from at least two major legitimating considerations in constitutional law 
(each, appropriately enough, with a different political valence): political process 
theory and historical tradition. 
1.  Updating Political Process Theory 
One key legitimating theory for constitutional judicial review in the post-
New Deal period is the so-called political process school of thought. As 
synthesized most famously by John Hart Ely in Democracy and Distrust, this 
theory posits that judicial review is legitimate in a democracy insofar as it either 
unblocks equal access to the political process or corrects for systematic 
disadvantages confronted by minority groups within that process.21 The theory 
thus aims to answer the “counter-majoritarian difficulty”—the question why 
allowing life-tenured judges to override majoritarian preferences is legitimate in 
a democracy—by understanding constitutional judicial review as aiding, rather 
than obstructing, democracy.22 
Though subject to various objections and qualifications that I will not 
address here,23 this theory’s basic premises have had profound structuring effect 
on overall patterns of modern doctrinal development.24 As classically 
formulated, however, the theory fails to account for the central process distortion 
 
 20. For this reason, my proposal is not an example of what Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have called 
the “inside/outside fallacy,” that is, an incoherent pairing of pessimistic assumptions about self-interested 
judicial behavior with optimistic normative prescriptions that judges behave disinterestedly. Eric A. Posner & 
Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743, 1745 (2013). Even if political 
scientists have shown that party affiliation is highly predictive of judicial behavior, no judge worthy of the name 
wants to be perceived as simply carrying into effect the political commitments of their partisan coalition. 
 21. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY & DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). The canonical 
judicial statement of political process theory is Carolene Products footnote four. United States v. Carolene 
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 22. The classic statement of this dilemma is ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: 
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–22 (1962). 
 23. For a recent survey of critiques, see Aaron Tang, Reverse Political Process Theory, 70 VAND. L. REV. 
1427, 1441–48 (2017). 
 24. In particular, political process theory helps explain current constitutional doctrine’s emphasis on 
protecting free expression (because elected officials can hardly be trusted to view public criticism neutrally), 
regulating criminal procedure (because accused criminals, not to mention the economically disadvantaged 
groups most likely to engage in crime, are quintessential disfavored minorities), and policing discrimination 
against racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities (because such groups are likely to face systematic 
disadvantage in the political process). See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process 
Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 748 (1991) (defending these features of constitutional law based on political process 
theory). Modern doctrine’s general structure of tiered scrutiny, which calibrates the intensity of judicial review 
to the degree of suspicion surrounding the legislative judgment at issue, likewise reflects political process 
theory’s focus on making the democratic process work, rather than overriding the outputs of its proper 
functioning. 
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we confront in our time: the risk, not that political in-groups will suppress 
political out-groups, but rather that the political process will cannibalize itself, 
degrading its own structures over time as each side’s pursuit of immediate 
tactical advantage yields tit-for-tat erosion of procedural norms. In other words, 
if the central preoccupation of constitutional theorists of Ely’s generation was 
the counter-majoritarian difficulty—the question why judicial invalidation of 
duly enacted laws was legitimate—the central danger to American 
constitutionalism in our time is that partisan animus will shred the very freedoms 
and institutions that enable pluralistic self-governance in the first place. 
While it is possible the partisan fever will soon break, yielding some more 
stable political order (and making this Essay poorly timed), the risk of 
institutional degradation due to negative partisanship hardly seems hypothetical 
at the moment. On the heels of the bitter fight over Justice Kavanaugh’s 
appointment, some conservatives are relishing the opportunity to cement a 
conservative Supreme Court majority for decades to come. At the same time, 
some progressives are sharpening their knives for eventual retribution, perhaps 
through aggressive measures such as defying Court decisions or expanding the 
Court’s future membership.25 Among those who take a broader view, political 
polarization has prompted worries that our political and legal order may be more 
fragile than was previously appreciated.26 The increasingly bare-knuckle 
character of American politics, as evidenced by (among other things) repeated 
government shutdowns and near shutdowns, routine Senate filibusters, and 
Senate Republicans’ year-long refusal to consider President Obama’s Supreme 
Court nominee, at least make it plausible that key norms enabling our 
constitutional government to function will continue a dangerous downward 
spiral.27 
To the extent these dangers are the central political-process distortion in 
our time, political process theory should support a judicial approach that 
accounts for them and attempts to mitigate their destructive effects. Favoring 
symmetric doctrines, holdings, and rationales over one-sided ones may be one 
important means of achieving that end. By contrast, other competing theories—
if left unadorned by a preference for symmetric constitutionalism—could 
threaten to undermine the political process by yielding understandings that are 
 
 25. See, e.g., Michael Klarman, Why Democrats Should Pack the Supreme Court, TAKE CARE BLOG (Oct. 
15, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/why-democrats-should-pack-the-supreme-court. 
 26. Tara Leigh Grove, for instance, has recently highlighted that key pillars of judicial independence—the 
permanence of judicial offices, state compliance with federal court orders, and aversion to court-packing—are 
in fact conventions of relatively recent vintage. Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial 
Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465, 469–70 (2018). Meanwhile, political scientists reflecting on international 
examples have noted how negative partisanship may degrade norms of forbearance vis-à-vis political adversaries 
that are ultimately necessary for democracy to function. See, e.g., STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW 
DEMOCRACIES DIE 8–9 (2018). 
 27. For worries that the United States is at risk of such “retrogression,” see Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, 
How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78, 85 (2018). 
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too often one-sided or politically fraught. Originalism and formalism, for 
example, might yield results and rationales indifferent to political workability, 
while theories of a “living constitution” may be more oriented towards 
entrenching current moral views than towards facilitating ongoing political 
contestation.  
2.  Recovering a Historical Tendency 
Apart from political process theory, a preference for symmetric 
constitutionalism can draw support from history and the basic structure of our 
Constitution. To begin with, as compared to many more recent constitutions 
(including those of some states), the U.S. Constitution is concise and speaks in 
broad generalities; it establishes a general framework for government while 
rarely addressing current policy questions with precision. Such a “framework” 
constitution, as some political scientists have called it,28 may well require at least 
a degree of symmetric interpretation to sustain itself. Because its text often 
(though not always)29 requires doctrinal elaboration to resolve concrete 
questions in a sufficiently determinate fashion, such a constitution can function 
in a divided polity only if both sides accept the basic legitimacy of procedures 
(such as judicial review) for elaborating its meaning and resolving concrete 
disputes.30 Symmetric constitutionalism may thus arise as a necessary impulse 
to sustain procedural legitimacy when public opinion on substantive questions 
is polarized. 
At any rate, the Framers who drafted our Constitution feared factional 
division and understood the risks it could pose to the constitutional order they 
established. Federalist No. 10, for example, warned that “instability, injustice, 
and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal 
diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished.”31 
Publius (here James Madison) thus argued that “[t]he friend of popular 
governments . . . . will not fail . . . to set a due value on any plan which, without 
violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for” what 
he called “the violence of faction.”32 President George Washington likewise 
worried in his Farewell Address that “[t]he alternate domination of one faction 
over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural to party dissension,” 
 
 28. See, e.g., ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 103–04, 164 
(2009). 
 29. Cf. id. at 164 (suggesting that “[t]he very vagueness of the [U.S. Constitution] has forced the Supreme 
Court to articulate the boundaries of the Constitution”). 
 30. Some features of the Constitution are either so uncontroversial or so clear that they do not permit 
serious disagreement. See infra Subpart II.A. 
 31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 47, 47 (Ian Shapiro 
ed., 2009). 
 32. Id.  
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could eventually lead to despotism and “the ruins of public liberty.”33 
(Expressing similar sentiment, former President Obama recently urged citizens 
of democracies to resist tribal animosity.34 “[D]emocracy demands,” he argued, 
“that we’re able also to get inside the reality of people who are different than us 
so we can understand their point of view.”35) 
Contrary to the Framers’ hopes, to be sure, partisan competition quickly 
emerged as an organizing feature of American politics.36 Within the two-party 
structure of government, however, symmetric constitutionalism may give 
judicial effect today to the founders’ anxiety to avoid destructive factionalism. 
Indeed, when acute negative partisanship did first emerge in the early republic, 
the most important judicial constitutionalist of them all, Chief Justice John 
Marshall, responded by favoring constitutional symmetry in important cases. 
Echoing the anti-factional sentiment of his generation, Marshall observed in a 
letter that “nothing is more to be deprecated than the transfer of party politics to 
the seat of Justice.”37 Accordingly, although his decisions gave effect to legal 
theories of his own Federalist party, Marshall also sought repeatedly to distribute 
his rulings’ benefits across partisan divides. 
For example, in his very first decision for the Court, the politically fraught 
case of Talbot v. Seeman,38 Marshall pleased anti-French Federalists by 
upholding a French ship’s capture during the Quasi-War, but then qualified the 
victory by reducing the American commander’s salvage award.39 Marshall’s 
decision establishing the principle of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison40 
reflects the same impulse. As was “typical[]” of Marshall, one biographer 
observes, his “decision [in Marbury] paid heed to the claims raised on both sides 
of the case. The High Federalists were awarded the nominal prize of hearing that 
Marbury was entitled to his commission, and the Republicans gained a victory 
 
 33. President George Washington, Farewell Address (1796), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_ 
century/washing.asp. 
 34. President Barack Obama, Speech at the 2018 Nelson Mandel Annual Lecture (July 17, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/07/17/629862434/transcript-obamas-speech-at-the-2018-nelson-mandela-annual-
lecture. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 
2319–25 (2006). 
 37. Letter from John Marshall to Timothy Pickering (Feb. 28, 1811), in 7 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 
270, 270 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1993); see also GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF 
THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 459 (2009) (discussing this letter and Marshall’s outlook). 
 38. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801). 
 39. JOEL RICHARD PAUL, WITHOUT PRECEDENT: CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL AND HIS TIMES 240–42 
(2018); JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 295 (1996). 
 40. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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with the dismissal of the rule to show cause.”41 One Republican newspaper even 
praised Marshall for “calm[ing] the tumult of faction.”42 
On some other politically fraught issues—questions, for example, 
regarding federal courts’ authority to recognize common law crimes43 or allow 
prosecutions for “constructive treason”44—Marshall deployed Republican 
constitutional theories against Republican presidents, thereby imposing a form 
of mutual disarmament on the political system. Whatever else justified them, 
such decisions can be understood as efforts to impose symmetric constraints on 
both partisan factions in Marshall’s day, thereby inviting a virtuous cycle of 
mutual toleration rather than a downward spiral of retributive political 
prosecution.45 As one recent biographer observes, “Chief Justice Marshall lived 
in a revolutionary age in which the country was deeply polarized by competing 
ideologies.”46 Yet he “creatively navigated his way through a thicket of domestic 
and international controversies, choosing his battles prudently and forging 
consensus where none seemed possible.”47 
 
 41. SMITH, supra note 39, at 323; see also 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES 
HISTORY: 1789–1835, at 245–55 (rev. ed. 1937) (discussing Marbury’s reception in the Federalist and 
Republican press). 
 42. SMITH, supra note 39, at 325, 626 n.72 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Aurora, April 26, 
1803). In general, although some Republican publications complained about the decision’s assertion of authority 
over the Executive and about its consideration of the merits despite finding no jurisdiction, see WARREN, supra 
note 41, at 249–53; 2 G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM RECONSTRUCTION THROUGH THE 
1920S, at 217 (2016), others highlighted the decision’s conciliatory character, see WARREN, supra, at 248 
(“While the Federalist commendation of Marshall’s opinion was profuse, it is surprising to note that the most 
bitterly partisan Republican papers . . . made no criticism of the decision . . . .”). 
 43. Riding circuit, Marshall repeatedly cast doubt on federal courts’ authority to recognize common law 
crimes, 2 WHITE, supra note 42, at 231; Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660, 665 (C.C.D. Va. 1811), an 
authority Federalist judges had earlier employed to prosecute Jeffersonian Republicans for sedition. SMITH, 
supra note 39, at 284. On the Supreme Court, Marshall held for the Court that federal courts’ jurisdiction is not 
“regulated by their common law” but instead “by written law.” Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93 
(1807). 
 44. In presiding over the treason trial of former Vice President Aaron Burr, Marshall rejected arguments 
that the Constitution allowed conviction, as under English common law, for “constructive treason” based on 
mere criticism of the government without any concrete action against it. SMITH, supra note 39, at 366–67 & n.*, 
371–72. Although the ruling’s immediate practical effect was to disempower a Democratic-Republican 
prosecution (prompting a Baltimore mob to burn Marshall in effigy, PAUL, supra note 39, at 294–95), Marshall’s 
decision effectively rejected a theory Federalists had earlier employed to repress Jeffersonians. WOOD, supra 
note 37, at 415–18. 
 45. Marshall himself alluded to this feature of the decisions, observing in Ex parte Bollman that 
the framers of our constitution, . . . must have conceived it more safe that punishment in such cases 
[of treason] should be ordained by general laws, formed upon deliberation, under the influence of no 
resentments, and without knowing on whom they were to operate, than that it should be inflicted 
under the influence of those passions which the occasion seldom fails to excite, and which a flexible 
definition of the crime, or a construction which would render it flexible, might bring into operation. 
Bollman, 8 U.S. at 127. 
 46. PAUL, supra note 39, at 440. 
 47. Id.; see also 1 WHITE, supra note 42, at 244 (2012) (“[The Court’s] stature [after Marshall] would be 
associated not only with its intervention in major contested issues but with its skill at striking the right balance 
between competing visions of American society.”). 
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If Chief Justice Marshall thus offers some early examples of symmetric 
constitutionalism, the most notorious Supreme Court decision of all time, Dred 
Scott v. Sanford,48 offers a paradigm case of disastrous asymmetry. Apparently 
assuming it could impose a one-sided pro-slavery result on an increasingly 
divided country, the Supreme Court ruled both that African Americans were not 
U.S. citizens and that slavery could not constitutionally be barred in federal 
territories.49 Far from removing the issue from politics, however, the decision 
put the Court itself in the emerging anti-slavery coalition’s cross-hairs,50 helping 
bring about the Civil War and quite possibly weakening the Court’s capacity to 
address other important questions during and after the War.51 
No doubt other examples of symmetric and asymmetric constitutionalism 
could be identified across American history, but I will not attempt a systematic 
historical account in this brief Essay. It suffices here to observe that an ethos 
favoring partisan symmetry can draw strength not only from political process 
theory, but also from our Constitution’s basic design, the anti-factional anxiety 
of its framers, and the measured approach Chief Justice Marshall applied to 
constitutional law during the country’s first period of acute factional 
partisanship. The negative example of Dred Scott, by contrast, stands as a stark 
warning about courts’ capacity to impose one-sided outcomes on a sharply 
divided polity. 
C.  SOME COMPETING VIEWS 
Other scholars, of course, have noticed political polarization’s potentially 
hazardous effects on constitutional law and governmental stability. Yet 
symmetric constitutionalism holds advantages over competing responses that 
have been put forward to date. 
Reflecting on the same political trends addressed here, Mark Graber 
worries that constitutional law in the years ahead may form a “yo-yo” pattern, 
swinging back and forth between extreme positions without any deep connection 
to consensus views in the polity.52 As the appropriate response, Graber 
 
 48. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 49. Id. at 422–23, 452. 
 50. For discussion of why Dred Scott failed in its immediate political context to settle the questions it 
addressed, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, 
THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 68–71 (2007). 
 51. See 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
OF THE UNITED STATES 394, 470 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing Dred Scott’s role in precipitating the Civil War and 
suggesting that during Reconstruction the Justices “recognized that the tangled emotional and constitutional 
issues of the time required discretion on their part” in part because “the consequences of Roger Taney’s rushing 
in to settle the slavery question in Dred Scott remained fresh in their memory”); 1 WHITE, supra note 42, at 367 
(2012) (“The effort of a majority of the Court [in Dred Scott] to constitutionalize proslavery ideology, and the 
opposition that effort precipitated, revealed that the great symbols of American cultural unity and national 
uniqueness, a Union of states created and defined by the Constitution of the United states, could no longer endure 
with the taint of slavery.”). 
 52. Graber, supra note 5, at 665–66, 704, 709–12. 
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advocates judicial minimalism53—an ethos, again, that favors narrow holdings 
and rationales.54 As I will illustrate in my discussion below, however, 
minimalism in the present climate may in fact be more polarizing than broader 
rulings that gesture towards symmetry. Almost every constitutional case carries 
some partisan valence in its immediate context, yet such cases often also involve 
applying frameworks and principles with other applications whose valence may 
be different. Symmetric constitutionalism encourages judges to highlight and 
develop those implications of their decisions. The resulting decisions may be 
less minimal, but their very breadth may help defuse partisan fury over particular 
outcomes by reinforcing underlying shared (or at least mutually beneficial) 
commitments. 
In another astute reflection on current legal politics, Jamal Greene worries 
about how well our broad-brush, “framework” constitution can contain the 
destructive tendencies of Schmittian political competition.55 Among other 
proposals, Greene advocates reorienting constitutional rights adjudication away 
from the current largely categorical approach and towards a focus on balancing 
and proportionality (the predominant approach among constitutional courts 
around the world).56 But while Greene hopes a proportionality focus will lower 
the stakes of constitutional litigation and encourage greater democratic 
deliberation,57 I fear the indeterminacy of balancing standards might only open 
the door to more partisan judging.58 At the very least, it could exacerbate public 
perceptions of judicial bias. Keeping an eye on partisan symmetry (and faulting 
judges for failing to do so) strikes me as a more concrete means of promoting 
the more “prosocial” constitutional culture Greene advocates (and rightly 
worries we are losing).59 
A third strand of scholarship reflecting on current trends has argued that 
courts either will or should adhere especially closely to precedent in light of 
political divisions that reduce the legal system’s overall political 
responsiveness.60 Yet even if current political dynamics yield a form of super-
strong stare decisis,61 the startling frequency of blockbuster constitutional cases 
in recent years—itself likely the result of fraying non-constitutional restraints on 
government action—suggests a strong likelihood that politically salient cases 
 
 53. Id. at 717–18. 
 54. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 4. 
 55. Greene, supra note 16, at 96–97. 
 56. Id. at 107; see also Jamal Greene, Foreword, Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 34–35 (2018) 
(generally advocating a proportionality approach to rights adjudication). 
 57. Greene, supra note 16, at 108. 
 58. For further discussion of this point, see infra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 59. Greene, supra note 16, at 94. 
 60. See generally RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT (2017); Thomas 
W. Merrill, Interpreting an Unamendable Text, 71 VAND. L. REV. 547 (2018). 
 61. I do not attempt any developed theory of stare decisis here. For some thoughts on Kozel’s 
“institutional” theory of precedent and its appeal in our moment, see Zachary S. Price, Precedent in a Polarized 
Era, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 433 (2018) (reviewing KOZEL, supra note 60). 
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will continue to arise in areas where precedent is non-existent or inconclusive. 
An ethos of symmetric constitutionalism may help courts navigate such 
controversies in ways that adherence to precedent alone may not. 
Finally, some will object in principle to pursuing bipartisan symmetry. 
Why pursue multilateral disarmament when total victory could be just over the 
next hill? And why seek symmetry if the other side is evil, illegitimate, or un-
American, as partisans on both sides appear increasingly to think? Without 
minimizing the depth of feeling surrounding current constitutional issues, or the 
dread our current president has prompted in some quarters, this foreseeable 
objection only demonstrates the partisan dynamics that risk eroding judicial 
capacity and degrading our constitutional culture. Again, it is possible that 
current knife-edge divides in American politics will soon give way to a more 
stable political order, but I doubt it, and in any event we are where we are, for 
the moment at least. To the extent deep polarization remains a central feature of 
American politics (or gets worse), preserving constitutional stability will require 
finding some constructive path forward that does not involve one side’s total 
domination of the other.62 
As for Donald Trump, the current President may well threaten our 
constitutional order and fundamental commitments.63 But those appalled by 
Trump should care about finding solutions to polarization. Trump is likely not 
only a cause but also a consequence of polarization; while the visceral feelings 
he evokes have exacerbated partisan animosities, the election of such an ill-
prepared and anti-constitutional personality likely would have been impossible 
in a more cohesive political culture. Furthermore, to the extent Trump himself 
does pose serious risks to the constitutional order, containing the damage will 
require not only checking specific unlawful or ill-advised actions, but also 
preserving the institutional structures and shared commitments that enable such 
checks to function. Symmetric constitutionalism could provide a means of doing 
so, for so long as the current polarized environment lasts. 
II.  APPLYING SYMMETRY 
Having made a normative case for symmetric constitutionalism, I will now 
attempt to elaborate the concept by exploring what critical purchase it might 
provide at different levels of constitutional analysis: first, at the level of overall 
interpretive theory and output; second, at the level of particular case outcomes 
and reasoning, using the Court’s recent term as a source of examples; and third, 
at the level of doctrinal design with respect to several areas of current 
 
 62. Cf. ABRAMOWITZ, supra note 14, at 120 (“The forces producing polarization in the American electorate 
are far from spent. . . . [P]olitical scientists and others concerned about the future of American democracy should 
focus on finding ways to help the political system function in a polarized era.”). 
 63. For an argument that Trumpism reflects a return to the Gilded Age constitutional vision associated with 
the Lochner era, see Mila Sohoni, The Trump Administration and the Law of the Lochner Era, 107 GEO. L.J. __ 
(forthcoming 2019). 
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constitutional controversy. In cases of conflict, choosing the level of generality 
at which to apply symmetry may present hard questions. I will not attempt here 
to resolve all such conflicts, but will instead focus on illustrating what critical 
purchase symmetry-based critiques may provide at each level. I will also suggest 
that symmetry likely has the greatest value in the mid-range—at the level of 
general doctrinal design. 
A.  SYMMETRY AT THE LEVEL OF THEORY AND OUTPUT 
The Constitution is obviously not agnostic between all possible political 
viewpoints. The Fourteenth Amendment is not neutral between racial equality 
and white supremacy; nor is the Constitution as a whole neutral between 
authoritarianism and representative democracy. Much of the Constitution, 
furthermore, is either uncontroversial or sufficiently clear to prevent reasonable 
disagreement. No one much disputes the value of regular elections; nor does 
anyone doubt (whether they like it or not) that each state gets two popularly 
elected Senators. On some level, the whole point of a Constitution is to take 
certain questions off the table. Symmetric constitutionalism accordingly has 
built-in limits. 
In addition, even within the range of reasonable interpretive disagreement, 
I have argued that constitutional symmetry is not so much a primary interpretive 
commitment as an ethos that judges with differing interpretive persuasions may 
equally apply. It thus, once again, may have limited capacity to override 
understandings dictated by a given judge’s primary interpretive understanding, 
whether that understanding is a form of originalism, interpretivism, common-
law constitutionalism, popular constitutionalism, or what have you. 
Even so, symmetric constitutionalism does have some critical purchase at 
high levels of interpretive generality. For one thing, at the level of raw output, a 
Supreme Court operating in a polarized environment that consistently rules in 
favor of one political faction’s constitutional vision may well invite the sort of 
legitimacy challenges that symmetric constitutionalism seeks to avoid. In recent 
years, we may have avoided such a pattern of results principally because Justice 
Kennedy’s cross-cutting legal views have shaped the Supreme Court’s output in 
close cases.64 To the extent that is true, and considering how Justice 
Kavanaugh’s confirmation has exacerbated partisan divides over constitutional 
law, more explicit attention to symmetry may have great value going forward. 
By the same token, a tilt towards symmetry might be a reason at the 
margins to prefer some general interpretive theories over others—or at least to 
encourage a gut check as to whether one has a theory, as opposed to a set of 
political commitments imported into constitutional law. In fact, any number of 
 
 64. For a rather apocalyptic argument to this effect, see Michael Brendan Dougherty, Anthony Kennedy 
Can’t Be Allowed to Die, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 23, 2018, 6:15 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/01/ 
anthony-kennedy-swing-vote-supreme-court-we-need-him-alive/ (speculating that Kennedy may have been “the 
one man preventing the United States from political breakdown”). 
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theories, if applied in principled fashion, could yield a symmetric body of case 
outcomes. Some fear, for example, that the currently ascendant interpretive 
philosophy of originalism is simply a smokescreen for reaching politically 
conservative outcomes. To the extent it is true (and it need not be), this worry 
would be a strike against the theory. By the same token, symmetric 
constitutionalism is a reason to disfavor strong forms of legal realism that deny 
any distinction between law and politics. In contrast, almost by definition, any 
interpretive method that aspires to a principled consistency independent of 
particular case results should yield at least a degree of cross-partisan symmetry. 
To lay my cards on the table, although this is not the place for a general 
interpretive theory, my own view is that constitutional interpretation should (and 
generally does) involve an exercise of holistic judgment centered on 
conventional forms of interpretive argument—text, structure, history, precedent, 
and policy—with a strong preference in most cases for maintaining fidelity to 
existing judicial precedents and governmental practices.65 Insofar as the pattern 
of results generated over time by this “mainstream” interpretive approach66 is 
unlikely to sharply favor one contemporary partisan coalition over the other, its 
symmetry may be an additional point in its favor.67 
In any event, symmetric constitutionalism’s main utility in charting a path 
forward is likely to come at lower levels of generality: through the reasoning in 
particular cases and the elaboration of doctrinal frameworks. 
B.  CASE-SPECIFIC EXAMPLES FROM JUSTICE KENNEDY’S LAST TERM 
To turn next to a much lower level of generality, the Supreme Court’s just-
completed blockbuster term—which turned out to be Justice Kennedy’s last—
provides abundant evidence of constitutional symmetry’s relevance to particular 
case outcomes in our moment. The term, for one thing, included an extraordinary 
volume of politically fraught, high-profile cases, many implicating key fears for 
the future of constitutional law and civil liberty in the Trump era.68 Even more 
important here, however, it also included several cases in which the Justices 
stumbled towards a vocabulary of constitutional symmetry. In Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion highlighted the potential conflict between gay rights and 
 
 65. For a useful account of this approach, see H. JEFFERSON POWELL, TARGETING AMERICANS: THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE U.S. DRONE WAR 191–93 (2016). For the canonical account of the basic interpretive 
modalities of constitutional law and their relevance, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
(1991). 
 66. POWELL, supra note 65, at 191. 
 67. Admittedly, this result may reflect in part the past influence of relatively moderate median justices on 
the Court’s jurisprudence. 
 68. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (challenge to “travel ban” barring certain 
immigrants from specified countries); Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (challenge to political 
gerrymandering). 
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religious freedom.69 In National Institute for Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra 
(NIFLA), Justice Breyer’s dissent faulted the majority for failing to be 
“evenhanded” in ruling on compelled-speech issues relating to abortion.70 And 
in Janus v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, 
Council 31, Justice Kagan’s dissent accused the majority of “weaponizing the 
First Amendment” and “turning [it] into a sword” to attack disfavored 
“economic and regulatory” policies.71 
At the level of particular decisions, my discussion will illustrate, symmetric 
constitutionalism may sometimes support broader statements of governing 
principles than minimalists would deem advisable, and sometimes it may 
support greater interference with democratic choices than Thayerians would 
wish. Often it will require forms of rhetoric and rationalization that courts have 
not typically employed. Yet by the same token symmetric constitutionalism may 
give force to moderating impulses in ways that preserve counter-majoritarian 
civil liberties and avoid simply splitting the difference in hard cases. For that 
reason, it is the appropriate attitude with which judges should approach divisive 
cases in our polarized era. 
1.  Masterpiece Cakeshop 
My first and central example, Masterpiece Cakeshop, reflects precisely the 
sort of clash between conflicting civil liberties with opposite partisan valence—
traditional religion on the one hand and marriage equality on the other—that 
current political fault lines seem likely to generate. The case also implicated just 
the sort of choice among doctrinal pathways—free exercise on the one hand and 
free expression on the other—that an ethos of symmetric constitutionalism can 
help navigate. Yet if the case was thus a test of symmetric constitutionalism’s 
value, the Court failed almost totally to appreciate it. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop presented the question whether a baker could 
decline on religious grounds to create a cake celebrating a same-sex marriage 
despite a state law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.72 
Although the Colorado Civil Rights Commission determined that the baker’s 
denial of service violated state law, the baker argued that this result amounted to 
both compelled expression in violation of constitutional free speech protections 
and an impermissible burden on his free exercise of religion.73 The Court chose 
to resolve the case on free exercise grounds, and on exceedingly narrow grounds 
at that.74 
 
 69. 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018). 
 70. 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2385 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 71. 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501–02 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 72. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1720. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
70.5-PRICE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2019  9:47 AM 
1292 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1273 
 
In the course of its deliberations, some members of the state Commission 
expressed hostility towards religion because of its historic use to legitimize 
injustices. “Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of 
discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the 
holocaust,” one commissioner declared.75 “[T]o me it is one of the most 
despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion to hurt 
others.”76 The Commission, furthermore, had found no impermissible 
discrimination on grounds of religion when bakers declined to produce cakes 
with religious messages opposing same-sex marriage.77 In the Court’s view, the 
Commissioners’ manifest animus towards religion, combined with their 
inconsistency in addressing comparable cases, showed that the Commission 
lacked the “religious neutrality” required by prior free exercises cases.78 
In tone and spirit, Justice Kennedy’s opinion aspired to bipartisan 
symmetry. Kennedy began by framing the dispute (correctly) as a conflict 
between “the rights and dignity of gay persons” and “the right of all persons to 
exercise fundamental freedoms under the First Amendment, as applied to the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment.”79 He faulted the Commission for its 
own lack of neutrality and emphasized that although “[o]ur society has come to 
the recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be treated as social 
outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth,” nevertheless “religious and 
philosophical objections to gay marriage are protected views and in some 
instances protected forms of expression.”80 By adhering closely to past 
precedent and breaking little new ground, furthermore, the Court embraced a 
minimalist spirit that at least avoided aligning itself dramatically with one 
political camp or the other. 
On a deeper level, however, the Court’s reasoning betrayed its own 
rhetorical posture. In fact, both the overall choice of rationale and the Court’s 
narrow focus on bad intent seem likely to undermine the very spirit of symmetric 
toleration that the opinion’s rhetoric aims to advance. 
To begin with, relying on free exercise rather than free expression grants 
doctrinal weaponry to adherents of traditional religion that secular progressives 
will lack—and within current political configurations traditional religious views 
(or even any religious adherence at all) are principally concentrated on one side 
of our partisan divides.81 A free expression holding, by contrast, would have 
held near-perfect symmetry across partisan divides. Had the Court held (as a 
 
 75. Id. at 1729 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1730. 
 78. Id. at 1731–32. 
 79. Id. at 1723. 
 80. Id. at 1727. I had the great privilege and honor to serve as a law clerk to Justice Kennedy and admire 
him in many ways, but my current role requires offering critical perspective, as I will attempt to do here. 
 81. For some general data on the increasing alignment of churchgoers with the Republican Party, see 
MASON, supra note 15, at 35. This alignment is not total, of course. 
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separate opinion by Justice Thomas urged82) that producing custom-designed 
cakes is expressive conduct implicating constitutional protections against 
compelled speech, this protection would have applied equally to all cakes and 
comparably expressive commercial services, no matter what message the cake 
or service were expressing. 
To be sure, insofar as a free expression holding would have swept beyond 
religious objections, that theory might have risked carving a larger hole in 
progressive anti-discrimination laws.83 But examples cutting the other way are 
not fanciful: in recent years dressmakers have refused to create inaugural gowns 
for First Lady Melania Trump, restaurants have refused service to Trump 
Administration officials, and lawyers have chosen not to represent certain 
causes.84 As Masterpiece Cakeshop illustrates, furthermore, such actions could 
conceivably violate prohibitions on religious or political discrimination (among 
other laws) in particular jurisdictions. Even a holding that cakes were not 
sufficiently expressive to implicate free-speech principles would have provided 
better guidance across the universe of disputes over commercial services with 
an expressive dimension. By contrast, the Court’s free-exercise holding will 
empower religious groups to seek exemption from general anti-discrimination 
laws, yet gives proponents of LGBT rights and other progressive goals no 
exemption from any legal restraints on anti-religious or political bias. 
It is also true that in this particular instance the Colorado commission’s 
own lack of symmetry supported the Court’s free exercise ruling. But again the 
decision’s logic does not work in reverse. If state authorities in a future case 
uphold religious denials of same-sex wedding cakes but not secular denials of 
anti-LGBT cakes, the secular bakers will have no recourse under Masterpiece 
Cakeshop’s free-exercise reasoning. At best, Masterpiece Cakeshop might 
support recognizing a parallel prohibition on governmental animus towards 
progressives in closely parallel circumstances, but even reaching that result 
would require extending the decision’s logic beyond religion, as the Court 
resisted doing in its opinion. In any case without the sort of specific biased 
statements at issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop, furthermore, progressive bakers or 
artisans would need to fall back on a broader theory that state law was effectively 
compelling expression of a viewpoint they do not hold. The latter claim would 
just bring courts back to the free expression argument that the Court avoided, 
and to some degree disparaged, in Masterpiece Cakeshop. Accordingly, even if 
 
 82. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 83. For an argument that the case should have been resolved narrowly based on the cakemaker’s “hybrid” 
speech and religion rights, see Barry P. McDonald, Same-Sex Wedding Cakes: Why Hybrid Rights Paradigm Is 
Best Way out of Thicket, NAT’L L.J. (Jan. 22, 2018, 9:55 AM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/sites/ 
nationallawjournal/2018/01/22/same-sex-wedding-cakes-why-a-hybrid-rights-paradigm-is-the-best-way-out-
of-the-thicket/. 
 84. Michael W. McConnell, Dressmakers, Bakers, and the Equality of Rights, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 
LGBT RIGHTS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMON GROUND 378, 378–84 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Robin 
Fretwell Wilson eds., 2018) (discussing dressmakers and several other examples). 
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the Court’s bottom-line result in Masterpiece Cakeshop is correct, a preference 
for partisan symmetry should have inclined the Court more sharply towards a 
free-expression rationale as opposed to the free-exercise holding it chose. 
One might argue that, from a broader point of view, Masterpiece Cakeshop 
was symmetric because it offset the Court’s earlier decision in Obergefell v. 
Hodges recognizing a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.85 The 
Obergefell decision, indeed, could itself have been more symmetric had the 
Court framed its holding as a protection against government compelling any one 
moral view of marriage, rather than as a right to same-sex marriage per se.86 But 
even if that is true, in Masterpiece Cakeshop a broader free-speech rationale 
could have provided a more symmetric, less divisive basis for the Court’s result 
than the narrow free-exercise rationale the Court chose.  
Even given the choice to focus on free exercise, furthermore, the Court’s 
doctrinal emphasis on apparent discriminatory motives made the decision’s 
asymmetry worse than it needed to be. Under present political circumstances, 
centering the inquiry on intent in cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop seems likely 
to exacerbate the very dynamics from which the opinion’s rhetoric recoils. For 
defenders of religious liberty, the hunt is now on for impure motivations lurking 
behind every adverse decision. Modern technology will make the search easier, 
as today every ill-considered text or email is potentially available to discovery, 
and even oral comments can be surreptitiously recorded. Nor will it be 
surprising, given many current progressives’ views on religion, to find 
expressions of animus akin to those deemed so nefarious in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop. 
Post-Masterpiece Cakeshop, when indications of bias are uncovered, 
courts will face imponderable disputes over what degree of taint so infects a 
decision as to condemn it under the Free Exercise Clause. In some cases, they 
will face further dilemmas over when, if ever, future unbiased proceedings can 
purge the taint from past deliberations. (Even in Masterpiece Cakeshop itself, 
the Court was vague about whether Colorado authorities could reach the same 
legal result in untainted future proceedings.87) Outside of the clearest cases, the 
inevitable arbitrariness of such determinations will open the door to judicial bias 
and thus to a sense of asymmetric grievance among losing litigants. 
A free expression holding, to be sure, would have bred litigation and line-
drawing too. Courts would have had to sort out which goods and services are 
sufficiently expressive in character to implicate constitutional protections 
against compelled expression, and the Court seems to have recoiled from 
 
 85. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 86. The Court’s decision included some language suggesting this view, albeit obliquely. For instance, the 
Court observed that “[t]he First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper 
protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to 
their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure they have long revered.” Id. at 2607. 
 87. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732 (“In this case the adjudication concerned a context that may 
well be different going forward in the respects noted above.”). 
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launching a quizzical jurisprudence of bakers, florists, hair-dressers, and 
painters.88 But however unsatisfactory such case law would have been, it could 
at least have been applied symmetrically. Courts could have drawn lines 
knowing full well that a freedom recognized in one case could be deployed to 
convey opposite messages in the future—and having reached such conclusions 
they could readily enforce the chosen lines apolitically. Accordingly, just as 
Masterpiece Cakeshop illustrates how symmetric constitutionalism may inform 
courts’ choice of rationale in a polarized period, so too does it illustrate why 
broader rulings may sometimes be preferable to narrower ones. In this case, at 
least, a broad free expression ruling would have had obvious bipartisan 
symmetry, and might for that reason have been less divisive than the religious 
freedom holding the Court chose. 
However hard the Court tried to deny this reality in its opinion, the fact is 
that conflict between competing world-views—one centered on traditional 
understandings and the other on personal liberation—is an animating feature of 
our current politics. The Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop will not 
purge this battle from the polity; it will instead force courts to referee endless 
disputes on a field tilted towards one team’s goal posts. The Court could better 
have protected civil liberty in our time by resolving the case on free expression 
grounds. Because that rationale would have conferred symmetric benefits across 
ideological divides, it would have kept the playing field level, thus enabling 
lower courts to resolve recurrent questions more neutrally and perhaps even 
encouraging citizens to view others’ freedoms as a reflection of their own. The 
decision is thus a case study in the costs of neglecting symmetric 
constitutionalism. 
2.  Other Compelled Speech Cases 
Two other cases last term in which symmetry featured explicitly, NIFLA89 
and Janus,90 offer further negative examples. These cases also highlight 
deficiencies in current vocabulary for addressing undue partisanship in judicial 
rulings. 
i.  NIFLA 
NIFLA presented the question whether California could require certain 
clinics serving pregnant women to notify clients that the state would pay for 
certain services, including abortions, and certain other clinics to provide notice 
that they were unlicensed (though no license for their operation was required).91 
The law’s evident purpose, and primary effect, was to require pro-life “crisis 
 
 88. Id. at 1728 (observing that “there are no doubt innumerable goods and services that no one could argue 
implicate the First Amendment”). 
 89. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 90. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 91. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2368–70. 
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pregnancy centers” that provide pregnancy-related care while discouraging 
abortion to alert clientele to the availability of more abortion-friendly 
alternatives. The Court held, however, that the law amounted to unconstitutional 
compelled speech.92 With respect to licensed clinics covered by the law, the 
majority deemed the notice requirement an impermissible “content-based 
regulation of speech.”93 The Court reasoned: “By requiring [the clinics] to 
inform women how they can obtain state-subsidized abortions—at the same time 
[the clinics] try to dissuade women from choosing that option—the licensed 
notice plainly ‘alters the content’ of [the clinics’] speech.”94 With respect to 
unlicensed clinics, similarly, the Court held that the law “targets speakers, not 
speech, and imposes an unduly burdensome disclosure requirement that will 
chill [the clinics’] protected speech.”95 The Court thus concluded that both 
aspects of the law violated the First Amendment under applicable standards of 
review. 
Standing alone, NIFLA’s holding was not necessarily asymmetric. 
Abortion, needless to say, is a fraught political issue, one on which the two 
partisan coalitions (or at least key elements of their bases) hold sharply divergent 
views. For that very reason, however, the Court could readily craft a symmetric 
compelled-speech doctrine, one protecting (or not) both abortion providers and 
pro-life clinics from obligations to relay messages with which they disagree. Yet 
Justice Breyer charged in dissent that the Court failed to do so.96 Although it had 
previously held that abortion providers could refuse to give certain notices, the 
Court overruled those precedents in 1992 in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.97 The controlling opinion in that case, 
Justice Breyer pointed out, upheld a law requiring abortion providers to relay 
information to patients not only about health risks of the procedure, but also 
about fetal development, available adoption services, and even available 
financial assistance for women carrying pregnancies to term.98 Against that 
backdrop, Breyer accused the majority of defying “the law’s demand for 
evenhandedness”99—effectively what I here call constitutional symmetry. “If a 
State can lawfully require a doctor to tell a woman seeking an abortion about 
adoption services,” Breyer asked, “why should it not be able, as here, to require 
a medical counselor to tell a woman seeking prenatal care or other reproductive 
healthcare about childbirth and abortion services?”100 
 
 92. Id. at 2365. 
 93. Id. at 2371. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 2378. 
 96. Id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 97. 505 U.S. 833, 882–83 (1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.). 
 98. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2385 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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The majority, to be sure, had an answer to this objection. It explained that 
the required notices in Casey were a means of assuring informed consent on the 
part of patients undergoing a medical procedure, not a form of ideological 
communication required for its own sake.101 Yet this answer, however coherent 
on its own terms, is nonetheless unsatisfactory from the perspective of 
symmetric constitutionalism. From a pro-choice point of view, depriving 
patients of information of alternative, more comprehensive service options is 
effectively depriving them of informed consent not to pursue those options. And 
while abortion opponents might object that a fetal life is at stake in one case but 
not the other, that distinction would only restate the ideological disagreement 
that free speech doctrine must negotiate. 
Much like Masterpiece Cakeshop, NIFLA illustrates how broader, rather 
than narrower, reasoning may sometimes be preferable in a politically polarized 
period. Even granting the majority’s informed-consent rationale for 
distinguishing Casey, other laws affecting abortion providers may not be 
justifiable on that basis.102 The majority might have reduced the decision’s 
asymmetry, and thus softened its partisan sting, by signaling openness to 
entertaining such challenges. Likewise, the Court might have gestured explicitly 
beyond abortion altogether, pointing out that compelled speech doctrine as a 
whole has obvious symmetric importance across the universe of possible cases. 
The same principle, indeed, excuses public school children from reciting the 
pledge of allegiance103 and drivers from carrying objectionable messages on 
their license plates,104 among other things. 
Under prevailing current norms of judicial rhetoric, many might consider 
referencing such broader implications unnecessary and perhaps even improper; 
they come perilously close to opining on matters not before the Court. But just 
as Chief Justice Marshall, in another polarized period, made the pro-Jeffersonian 
outcome in Marbury v. Madison effectively symmetric by including extended 
dicta on judicial review and the rule of law, so too might express reference to 
situations not before the Court today help render politically fraught decisions 
more palatable. 
ii.  Janus 
Janus, yet another compelled speech case, presents similar concerns. The 
Janus majority held, contrary to the Court’s forty-year old decision in Abood v. 
Detroit Board of Education,105 that public employers may not compel union-
 
 101. Id. at 2373–74. 
 102. See generally Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled 
Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939 (questioning validity of certain speech requirements for physicians 
providing abortions). 
 103. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 104. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977). 
 105. 431 U.S. 209 (1977), overruled by Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 
S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
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represented public employees to pay dues to support the union’s representational 
functions.106 In Abood, the Court had recognized that compelled subsidization 
of union political activities, such as campaigning and electioneering, violated 
First Amendment protections against compelled speech.107 The Abood Court 
nonetheless concluded that compelled support for union representational 
activities—its work negotiating contracts and representing employees in 
grievance proceedings, among other things—was a valid form of labor 
regulation aimed at ensuring “labor peace” in public workplaces.108 Rejecting 
this distinction, the Janus majority held instead that all public-sector union 
activities are so laden with policy import that compelling any subsidization 
amounts to impermissible compelled speech.109 The Court thus overturned the 
laws of some twenty-two states that required payment of union dues in 
accordance with Abood. 
No less than NIFLA, Janus may well present a difficult question on the 
merits regarding proper elaboration of compelled-speech doctrine. Yet the 
decision’s “political valence,” as the majority opinion itself frankly 
acknowledged, is unmistakable.110 Public-sector unions generally support the 
Democratic Party through contributions, mobilization, and other forms of 
campaign support, and although Abood forbid requiring direct support for such 
activities, unions’ power to collect dues for their other activities may well have 
been important to their overall vitality (or at least union supporters so fear).111 
The Court’s holding in Janus was thus a one-sided blow to the liberal 
coalition, and was widely perceived as such, but symmetric constitutionalism 
permits sharpening of this critique. To begin with, Abood itself had not been the 
one-sided victory that Janus suggests. On the contrary, Abood was something of 
a symmetric compromise: unions lost the option of compelling membership and 
support for political activities, while in exchange conservative union-objectors 
lost the freedom to decline support for representational activities. Janus thus 
undid an arguably symmetric result to achieve a more asymmetric one. 
Even if Janus’s bottom-line was correct, furthermore, the opinion dripped 
with gratuitous rhetoric of a sort symmetric constitutionalism should discourage. 
Justice Alito’s majority opinion observed, for example, that the “ascendance of 
public-sector unions [since Abood] has been marked by a parallel increase in 
public spending,” as if such spending were self-evidently undesirable (a 
 
 106. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460. 
 107. Abood, 431 U.S. at 232. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2475–77. 
 110. Id. at 2483. 
 111. See, e.g., Douglas Schoen, Opinion, Unions and Dems Lost Big in Janus, HILL (June 29, 2018, 5:30 
PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/394907-unions-and-dems-lost-big-in-janus (“The decision has major 
ramifications for the national political landscape because unions, specifically public-sector unions, have long 
been staunch supporters of Democratic candidates.”). 
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conclusion many progressives would dispute).112 Likewise, Alito laid the 
problems of underfunded public pension liabilities and municipal bankruptcies 
at public unions’ feet, without seeming to consider that conservative hostility to 
taxation could bear part of the blame as well.113 As in NIFLA, it would have been 
far more constructive, and done more to support the decision’s legitimacy in a 
polarized nation, had the majority instead emphasized how the compelled speech 
doctrine it employed has obvious symmetric applications in other contexts with 
opposite partisan valence. 
Still more relevant here was Justice Kagan’s complaint in dissent that the 
Janus majority “weaponiz[ed] the First Amendment, in a way that unleashes 
judges, now and in the future, to intervene in economic and regulatory 
policy.”114 On its face, this language was exaggerated and imprecise. While 
Janus might have implications beyond the union context, its compelled speech 
rationale need not cast doubt on “workaday economic and regulatory policy,” as 
Justice Kagan claimed.115 Nor is it clear that the First Amendment is any more 
of a “weapon[]” and “sword” in this context than when used to reach liberal 
results that interfere with democratic choices. Proponents of laws requiring 
recital of the pledge,116 restricting pornography that dehumanizes women,117 or 
limiting sale of violent video games to minors118 surely felt the First Amendment 
was weaponized against them too. 
Nevertheless, Justice Kagan was right to sound an alarm. Appreciating why 
requires taking broader stock of First Amendment doctrine, as I will do below 
in Subpart II.C. As I understand her, Justice Kagan was attempting to raise an 
asymmetry objection: she was rejecting, and attempting to preempt, a threatened 
extension of First Amendment principles beyond symmetric concerns about 
enabling open debate and “protect[ing] democratic governance” into highly 
partisan interference with economic and workplace regulation.119 Her dissent 
thus implied—correctly—that even a formally symmetric doctrine like the First 
Amendment rule against content-discrimination may become substantively 
asymmetric in effect unless courts take care to maintain symmetry in 
determining the doctrine’s scope of application. Her misfired articulation of this 
point only illustrates how deficient our current constitutional vocabulary is for 
expressing such concerns. 
 
 112. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2483. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 115. Id. 
 116. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 117. Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
 118. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
 119. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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3. An Aside on Murphy and the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine 
Before turning away from the recent term and towards broader debates over 
the First Amendment and other matters, let me close this Subpart with one 
constructive example, albeit one in which symmetry concerns made no explicit 
appearance. In Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,120 the Court 
reviewed the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, a rather odd 
federal statute forbidding states from “authorizing” certain forms of sports 
betting and further providing a civil cause of action to enjoin operation of any 
such state-authorized sports-betting businesses.121 The Court understood the 
law, which exempted states that allowed sports betting at the time of enactment, 
to prohibit any other states from altering their laws to eliminate prohibitions on 
sports gambling.122 So construed, the Court held, the statute impermissibly 
“commandeered” the state legislative process, dictating how states could 
regulate rather than regulating private parties directly.123 Based on past 
precedent, the Court held that such commandeering violated the independent 
sovereignty assured to states by the federal Constitution.124 It then further held 
that none of the statute’s provisions, including its cause of action to enjoin 
private state-authorized gambling, were severable from the defective 
provisions.125 
While the Court’s severability holding (and thus its ultimate bottom line) 
may be debatable, Murphy’s strong reaffirmation of the anti-commandeering 
principle provides a textbook example of bipartisan symmetry in this moment. 
In a nation divided between predominantly Republican “red” states and 
predominantly Democratic “blue” states, constitutional federalism principles are 
increasingly intersecting with matters of intense substantive controversy. Red 
state legislatures and attorneys general worked to undercut the Affordable Care 
Act and lenient federal policies toward immigration during the Obama years; 
blue states today have repeatedly challenged Trump Administration policies, 
particularly its efforts to strengthen immigration enforcement. 
Whether or not it is correct as a matter of first principles, the anti-
commandeering doctrine at least carries the benefit of applying symmetrically 
across all such disputes. Whatever a case’s substance, the doctrine makes 
outcomes turn on a straightforward, value-neutral question: did the federal law 
in question compel state legislation or executive action, or did it instead only 
authorize or encourage it? In this particular moment, this understanding of 
constitutional federalism appears markedly preferable to alternative approaches, 
such as the Court’s earlier (and later abandoned) effort to identify “essential state 
 
 120. 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
 121. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 (2012), invalidated by Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461. 
 122. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1474. 
 123. Id. at 1478. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1484. 
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functions” that were appropriately exempt from federal regulation.126 Whereas 
any such approach would require courts to apply open-ended and manipulable 
criteria in hot-button cases, the anti-commandeering principle provides courts 
with a straightforward, readily administrable rule that can be applied neutrally 
across the universe of cases. 
Back when federalism was more generally perceived as a conservative 
cause, the most liberal justices dissented from key anti-commandeering 
decisions.127 From a symmetry point of view, that view looks short-sighted; the 
contingency of the doctrine’s political valence in any given instance should have 
been apparent even then. In any event, in the red, blue, and purple America of 
today, the doctrine is unambiguously symmetric. Symmetric constitutionalism 
should therefore incline judges of all stripes towards preserving it, theoretical 
objections notwithstanding. 
C.  SYMMETRY AT THE LEVEL OF DOCTRINE 
A last level of generality to consider falls in the mid-range, at the level of 
general doctrinal principles and frameworks. Here, indeed, symmetry may be 
most useful, as it can support leaning towards one general principle or another, 
or going down one pathway but not some alternative. In hopes of further 
illustrating the concept and demonstrating what critical purchase it can provide, 
I will here briefly address five general areas of significant current controversy: 
freedom of expression; structural constitutional law; equal protection doctrine; 
the Second Amendment; and substantive due process. 
Almost by definition, this enterprise involves addressing several areas of 
intense disagreement, at a time when passions are running high. I emphasize that 
I do not intend here to take any ultimate position on how the Constitution should 
be interpreted in any of these areas. I aim simply to illustrate what positions are 
and are not symmetric, or are more or less symmetric, and thus which positions 
should receive a thumb on the scale by virtue of the ethos I advocate. Once again, 
judges (and commentators) are free to reach asymmetric results when the 
Constitution as they understand it so requires. Within the bounds of controlling 
considerations of text, structure, precedent, and history, however, symmetry 
should be a reason to lean one way rather than another, and it should also be a 
reason for judges to proceed cautiously, with due attention to mitigating negative 
effects, when reaching sharply asymmetric conclusions. 
 
 126. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 579 (1985) (overruling Nat’l League of 
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). 
 127. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 939 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 190 (1992) (White, J., dissenting). 
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1.  Free Speech Absolutism 
Let me start with a comparatively easy case: The principle of content-
neutrality around which modern American free speech doctrine is organized 
provides a paradigmatic example of symmetric constitutionalism. Subject to 
narrowly defined (and viewpoint-neutral) exceptions for threats, incitement, 
defamation, and fighting words, among other things, modern doctrine subjects 
any content-based restriction on expression to strict scrutiny.128 A regulation that 
applies based on a given statement’s viewpoint or subject-matter is thus 
constitutional only if it is necessary to achieve a compelling government 
purpose.129 By the same token, in administering permitting regimes for public 
protests and other uses of public forums, officials must maintain neutrality 
between ideas being expressed; they may not base denials and restrictions on the 
offense (or even anger and violence) that controversial speech may trigger in its 
audience.130 
This approach took hold on the Supreme Court in the 1960s and 1970s, 
against the backdrop of the Civil Rights Movement, when it had the obvious 
benefit of protecting civil rights protesters and other dissidents from government 
repression.131 Since then, it has become a striking point of judicial consensus. 
Although judges and justices have diverged on its proper implications in a 
number of areas (most notably campaign finance), judges of varied ideological 
dispositions have repeatedly endorsed the principle that “[t]he First Amendment 
recognizes no such thing as a ‘false’ idea.”132 
The end result is a constitutional law of expressive freedom that confers 
benefits across the political spectrum: whatever partisan valence speech carries, 
indeed even if it is far outside mainstream opinion, it is equally protected. The 
doctrine thus provides strong protection for over-heated rhetoric within each 
political coalition, as well as strong assurances that judges’ own biases will not 
infect the degree of protection they afford to particular statements. Judges, 
indeed, routinely test their intuitions in particular cases or about how doctrine 
should further develop by positing hypothetical utterances with opposite 
political import. These symmetric benefits might even explain the doctrine’s 
durability amid other vicissitudes in constitutional law. Conservative judges in 
a liberal culture can appreciate expressive freedom’s value just as readily as 
liberal judges in a conservative polity. We all have our favorite dissidents, even 
if we no longer agree on which are most worthy. The doctrine’s symmetry, 
 
 128. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 
U.S. 786, 805 (2011). 
 129. See, e.g., Brown, 564 U.S. at 805. 
 130. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130–31, 133–34 (1992). 
 131. For my own earlier discussion of this history and its importance today, see Zachary S. Price, Our 
Imperiled Absolutist First Amendment, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 817, 821 (2018). 
 132. E.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)). 
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moreover, could make it self-reinforcing. By adhering so firmly to a readily 
administrable rule of across-the-board protection, courts encourage citizens to 
see others’ freedom as a reflection of their own, even as divergence in the views 
actually espoused sharpens. 
Nevertheless, this understanding might well be coming under increasing 
pressure. On the Court itself, several more liberal Justices have advocated a 
looser approach focused more on a regulation’s specific rationales and 
consequences than application of any categorical rule. Justice Breyer, for 
instance, has argued that “[t]he First Amendment requires greater judicial 
sensitivity both to the Amendment’s expressive objectives and to the public’s 
legitimate need for regulation than a simple recitation of categories, such as 
‘content discrimination’ and ‘strict scrutiny,’ would permit.”133 Although this 
approach aims to be more responsive to competing concerns and provide a 
model of deliberative democracy, the very mushiness of such context-dependent 
judgments could risk degrading First Amendment doctrine’s current symmetry. 
The content-based rule is symmetric; particular legal rationales often are not. 
What is more, in a polarized society, judgments about how to weight competing 
societal concerns are likely to be highly variable. Inviting greater judicial 
subjectivity in First Amendment doctrine could thus erode public confidence 
that judges are applying the law neutrally across competing ideological 
positions. 
Outside the Court, meanwhile, a troubling increase in the volume and 
visibility of bigoted speech has led some to call for official suppression of 
offensive speech on grounds of equality.134 Though this view shows no sign so 
far of gaining traction on the Court,135 such proposals could also risk eroding 
First Amendment law’s symmetry and thus triggering a more general slackening 
of expressive freedom. At the least, amid current partisan dynamics, it seems 
unlikely that any weakening of protections for hateful or offensive expression 
will redound wholly to one side of our political divides. More likely, through a 
process Eugene Volokh has called “censorship envy,” weakened protection for 
offensive speech directed at some groups will simply yield calls for greater 
protection against speech that similarly offends other groups.136 At any rate, 
abandoning the doctrine’s current ideological symmetry, however appealing in 
the abstract, could again jeopardize the doctrine’s political foundations, making 
civil liberty appear to be a one-sided value rather than a broadly shared 
implication of citizenship that all within the polity must respect. 
 
 133. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 134. I discussed these developments in Price, supra note 131. 
 135. The Court unanimously rejected any such position in Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1749 (2017) 
(plurality opinion); see also id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 136. Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1059–61 (2003) 
(describing “censorship envy” as likely to arise “when a free speech exception is created for one constituency,” 
with the consequence that “others may resent even more the absence of an exception for their own favored 
cause”). 
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On the other side of the spectrum, as Janus and NIFLA reflect, 
conservatives on the Court (and outside it) also risk drifting into highly partisan 
applications of speech doctrine through inattention to its proper scope of 
application.137 While the Court’s general First Amendment absolutism enjoys 
broad support among the current Justices, the Court’s campaign finance 
jurisprudence is controversial not only among the Justices but also among the 
broader public. The same is true of decisions like NIFLA and Janus that extend 
First Amendment protection into areas of economic and workplace regulation 
with clear partisan valences. As Justice Kagan observed in her Janus dissent:  
Speech is everywhere—a part of every human activity (employment, health care, 
securities trading, you name it). For that reason, almost all economic and 
regulatory policy affects or touches speech. So the majority’s road runs long. And 
at every stop are black-robed rulers overriding citizens’ choices. The First 
Amendment was meant for better things. It was meant not to undermine but to 
promote democratic governance . . . .138 
Again, rather than complaining about the First Amendment being 
“weaponiz[ed]” in general, Justice Kagan here effectively raised a concern about 
converting the Court’s formally symmetric jurisprudence of content-neutrality 
into a substantively asymmetric doctrine by selectively expanding the doctrine’s 
scope of application. In other words, by employing the First Amendment to 
disrupt economic and workplace regulations valued principally by progressives, 
an emerging jurisprudence of “First Amendment Lochnerism,” as some have 
described it,139 risks being perceived as advancing one partisan camp’s agenda 
at the expense of the other’s. Such asymmetry could again make expressive 
freedom as a whole appear partisan, fueling calls for reciprocal restrictions and 
thus weakening overall support for expressive freedom in the broader 
constitutional culture. 
Broad expressive freedom has been such a strong American value, and such 
a strong point of consensus on the Court, that fears of it slipping away or 
becoming more partisan may seem quixotic. But consider two recent data points. 
First, in a separate opinion in Janus, Justice Sotomayor explained that she was 
joining Justice Kagan’s dissent in full despite having earlier joined the majority 
opinion invalidating an economic regulation in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.140 
Sotomayor wrote that she did so because of “the troubling development in First 
Amendment jurisprudence over the years, both in this Court and in lower 
 
 137. As Frederick Schauer has observed, the Court’s cases have generally failed to articulate any clear 
framework for differentiating which verbal acts trigger First Amendment analysis. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, 
The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 1765, 1766–67, 1801–02 (2004). 
 138. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2502 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 139. See, e.g., Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 
1915, 1917–18 (2016); see also Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The 
Ascendant Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1399–1400 (2017). 
 140. 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
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courts,” in decisions like NIFLA and Janus.141 Second, in an interview, Justice 
Alito explained his dissents in several speech cases by highlighting then-retired 
Justice Stevens’s advocacy of a constitutional amendment to overturn the 
Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission142 
protecting corporate political speech.143 “[I]f we lose focus on what is at the core 
of the free-speech protection by concentrating on these peripheral issues [as in 
the cases where he dissented],” Justice Alito worried, “there’s a real danger that 
our free-speech cases will go off in a bad direction.”144 
Both these statements at least hint at the possible contingency of some 
Justices’ votes on other Justices’ commitment to apply doctrinal principles 
symmetrically. To the extent that is true, more explicit attention to symmetric 
constitutionalism and the benefits of maintaining current doctrine’s overall 
symmetry could help both the Court and the constitutional culture at large avoid 
such tit-for-tat degradation of civil liberty. 
2.  Structural Questions 
As the earlier Murphy discussion reflects, the structural Constitution—
separation of powers and federalism—should be another paradigm case of 
symmetric constitutionalism, though here once again the partisan gale threatens 
to blow judges off course. Particularly in a period like ours in which voters are 
closely divided over substantive policies, it should be obvious that structural 
rulings advantaging one partisan camp today may be put to quite different policy 
aims in the future. Nonenforcement authority evoked to benefit immigrants and 
marijuana entrepreneurs in the Obama years could benefit gun owners or 
regulated industries in a later administration; a ruling today supporting state 
sanctuaries against federal immigration enforcement might tomorrow thwart 
federal firearms or environmental regulation. In these areas and others like them, 
positions embraced today may well advantage quite different presidents (or 
Congresses or states) in the future. Judges should thus have ready means of 
maintaining an ethos of symmetry: they need only check their intuitions in any 
given case by imagining how identical principles would apply in a case with 
opposite political valence. 
It may be true that in the recent past structural constitutional questions had 
sharper partisan valences, with liberals favoring robust federal authority and 
defending the post-New Deal administrative state’s constitutionality (and 
conservatives holding misgivings about both). To some degree, these questions 
retain the same political dimension. At the least, any decision sharply 
diminishing federal legislative or administrative capacity would strike most 
 
 141. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 142. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 143. Samuel Alito Transcript, CONVERSATIONS WITH BILL KRISTOL (July 10, 2015), 
https://conversationswithbillkristol.org/transcript/samuel-alito-transcript/.  
 144. Id. 
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progressives as a paradigm case of conservative judicial activism. Short of any 
such extreme ruling, however, the political valence of structural constitutional 
question may no longer be quite as one-sided. The governing conservative 
coalition, after all, favors robust federal action in some areas, such as 
immigration, while pursuing deregulatory action in other areas. As for 
federalism, the country’s relatively even division into blue states and red states 
has made questions about state and federal power more readily symmetric. At 
the least, as we saw, principles such as anti-commandeering can be deployed as 
easily for liberal as conservative ends. 
Nevertheless, if the governing structural principles themselves have grown 
less partisan in character, the pressures on courts to rule one way or the other on 
the merits have only grown stronger. Indeed, the key danger in our moment is 
not so much that courts will embrace asymmetric structural principles, but rather 
that they will apply those principles unevenly due to political exigencies in each 
particular case—or for that matter that they will stumble into incorrect structural 
rulings so as to reach congenial substantive outcomes. During the Trump years, 
lower courts have reached dubious decisions regarding the revocability of 
administrative guidance, among other things, without seeming to anticipate how 
Trump-appointed judges might employ these same precedents to reach different 
substantive ends during a future liberal administration.145 Similarly, some 
argued during the Obama years that political polarization and resulting 
congressional incapacity necessitated an expansion in executive and 
administrative authority.146 Progressive enthusiasm for this academic view 
seems now to have waned, though one suspects it will one day spring back. 
Meanwhile, repeated nationwide injunctions of major government programs risk 
fostering a jaded perception that federal judges appointed by one party will 
always find ways to block major programs by the other party’s presidents.147 
Should any such view take hold, or if executive officials are tempted into 
outright defiance of court decisions, the damage to court authority and the rule 
of law could be severe. 
Explicit attention to constitutional symmetry can help judges resist these 
blind alleys. A theory of executive power or federalism or any other structural 
principle that is acceptable only if exercised by one’s co-partisans is not a legal 
 
 145. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1048 
(N.D. Cal. 2018) (enjoining termination of non-binding immigration relief program). For my contemporaneous 
critique of this decision, see Zachary Price, Why Enjoining DACA’s Cancellation Is Wrong, TAKE CARE BLOG 
(Jan. 12, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/why-enjoining-daca-s-cancellation-is-wrong. 
 146. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2–3 
(2014); cf. David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2 (2014) (discussing 
presidential “self help” remedies to congressional norm-violations). 
 147. For competing views on the legality of such injunctions, see generally Amanda Frost, In Defense of 
Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065 (2018) (in favor), Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the 
“Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2020) (same), and Samuel L. Bray, Multiple 
Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417 (2017) (opposed). 
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theory but an act of force. As such, it will command diminished respect by the 
public and political actors alike. To avoid the institutional damage and loss of 
credibility that could result from repeated decisions of this sort, courts should 
redouble their effort to ensure that their structural rulings satisfy this basic 
criterion of symmetric constitutionalism. 
3.  Equal Protection Egalitarianism 
Key features of a third area of doctrine, equal protection, also reflect 
constitutional symmetry, and the symmetric perspective may again highlight 
some under-appreciated benefits of the existing doctrine, whether or not it is 
ultimately sound as a matter of first principles. 
For one thing, equal protection doctrine’s overall focus on classification 
rather than disadvantage is symmetric in the strictly empirical sense that it 
distributes the doctrine’s benefits across different groups (and thus political 
parties), potentially resulting in a more politically stable conception of civil 
liberty. Current equal protection doctrine generally views all race-conscious 
government action as suspect.148 Such actions are thus constitutional only if they 
satisfy strict scrutiny, meaning that they must be necessary to accomplishing 
some compelling government purpose.149 In other areas, such as sex 
discrimination, the Court has followed a parallel approach, focusing on the 
nature of the classification rather than whether the litigant’s own group has been 
subject to historic prejudice.150 
From some points of view, protecting historically privileged groups against 
rare instances of prejudice is perverse.151 As Justice Rehnquist observed in his 
dissent in Craig v. Boren, a key early gender discrimination case involving 
disadvantaging of young men, 
Most obviously unavailable to support any kind of special scrutiny in this 
case [] is a history or pattern of past discrimination, . . . . There is no suggestion 
in the Court’s opinion that males in this age group are in any way peculiarly 
disadvantaged, subject to systematic discriminatory treatment, or otherwise in 
need of special solicitude from the courts.152 
With respect to gender, targeting such laws was a calculated strategy (developed 
by now-Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg) to appeal to a male-dominated 
judiciary.153 Apart from its immediate tactical utility, however, this approach 
 
 148. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207–08 (2016); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson 
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989). 
 149. See, e.g., Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2208.  
 150. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 525 (1996). 
 151. For a concise survey of arguments supporting an “anti-subordination” approach to anti-discrimination, 
see Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 155 (2017). 
 152. 429 U.S. 190, 219 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 153. See, e.g., David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women’s Rights in a Man’s World, 2 
LAW & INEQ. 33, 53–58 (1984) (discussing Ginsburg’s strategy). But cf. Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping 
Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 88 (2010) (“Ginsburg pressed the 
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could have broader political value. As one recent study of anti-discrimination 
statutes observes, “[a] symmetrically designed law [here meaning a law that 
applies equally to all races and genders] brings political benefits, as the 
universality of such laws helps to enhance support for them.”154 To the extent 
symmetric statutes carry such benefits, a universally applicable constitutional 
prohibition on race or sex discrimination might likewise invite less political 
controversy. From that point of view, whatever the anti-classification theory’s 
ultimate merits, understanding the Equal Protection Clause to protect everyone, 
and not only particular groups, from identity-based disadvantage might at least 
carry the political benefit of giving everyone a stake in preserving the governing 
principles—even if those principles serve overwhelmingly in practice to protect 
the groups and individuals most likely to face invidious prejudice.155 
The question becomes more fraught, however, with respect to affirmative 
measures aimed not at specific adverse treatment but instead at improving the 
condition of historically disadvantaged groups. On this question, progressives 
have long complained that a formally symmetric color-blindness (or sex-
blindness) principle may become functionally asymmetric due to accumulated 
effects of present-day prejudice and historic disadvantage. Giving partial effect 
to this view, the Court’s moderate conservatives, in a series of opinions on 
higher-education going back to Justice Powell’s controlling one-Justice opinion 
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,156 have relaxed the overall 
anti-classification approach to allow limited consideration of race and other 
 
claims of male plaintiffs in order to promote a new theory of equal protection founded on an anti-stereotyping 
principle.”). 
 154. Naomi Schoenbaum, The Case for Symmetry in Antidiscrimination Law, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 69, 116 
(2017). Schoenbaum discusses “[s]everal theories of political support” that support this conclusion. Id. at 116–
20. She goes on to argue that “the benefits of symmetry in the context of race are weaker than in the context of 
age and sex,” but nonetheless notes several benefits of racial symmetry, including the likelihood that “universal 
laws garner more political support, and thus can be more effective than targeted laws at promoting equality.” Id. 
at 123. In another recent treatment of symmetry in anti-discrimination statutes, Bradley Areheart observes that 
“symmetry aligns the interests of majority and minority groups in the following way: If all groups are protected 
under a relevant ground, then all groups (including the majority group) have a stake in both the passage and 
implementation of that protection.” Bradley A. Areheart, The Symmetry Principle, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1085, 1110–
11 (2017); see also id. at 1113 (“[T]he fact that all groups are protected may facilitate more goodwill, than under 
an asymmetric measure, through a sense that the law is fair and even-handed.”). After discussing a range of costs 
and benefits to anti-discrimination symmetry, Areheart argues that an anti-subordination understanding of equal 
protection is preferable with respect to race. Id. at 1133–34 (discussing Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above 
All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986)). My only objective here is to highlight 
the political benefit of an equal protection jurisprudence that gives something to both sides of major partisan and 
ideological divides; I take no position on what understanding of equal protection should ultimately prevail. 
 155. A more jaded version of this argument posits that “the interest of blacks in achieving racial equality is 
accommodated only when that interest converges with the interests of whites in policy-making positions.” 
Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education: Reliving and Learning from Our Racial History, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 
21, 22 (2004); cf. Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2171–72 (2013). 
 156. 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (Powell, J.). 
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suspect factors as part of a holistic, individualized assessment aimed at achieving 
student-body diversity.157 
Insofar as current partisan configurations appear (depressingly) to involve 
increasingly divergent views on this question and other racial issues,158 the 
moderate Justices’ middle-ground understanding might well be more symmetric 
in the particular context of affirmative action than competing proposals in either 
direction. On an ideological level, after all, the Bakke approach reflects a certain 
compromise between a (mostly progressive) focus on group disadvantages and 
a (mostly conservative) focus on present-day individual merit. At the same time, 
on a rawer political level, the middle-ground approach may allow public 
institutions to pursue goals of diversity and inclusion with respect to race and 
other suspect characteristics so long as the effort is refracted through a broader 
individualized assessment including other forms of diversity, such as class, 
religion, family background, and personal adversity, that may have varied 
political valences.159 By the same token keeping focus on individualized 
assessment, as the Bakke understanding requires, might help preserve broader 
political support for efforts to overcome historic discrimination.160 By contrast, 
under current political configurations, foreclosing such measures altogether, as 
some Justices have sought to do,161 would likely appear highly partisan and 
divisive.  
As with all issues addressed here, symmetric constitutionalism need not be 
dispositive. Symmetric constitutionalism is an ethos, not an interpretive theory; 
judges’ primary interpretive commitments need not always bow to it. 
Nevertheless, here, as in other areas, recognizing symmetry as a value can yield 
fresh perspective on the likely political effects of different doctrinal formulations 
in a polarized period. Whatever one makes of it as a matter of first principles, 
current equal protection doctrine’s qualified anti-classification approach 
distributes constitutional benefits across the population, straddling identity-
based partisan divides and encouraging citizens to view others’ freedom as a 
 
 157. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003). 
 158. See, e.g., MASON, supra note 15, at 38–40; Eugene Scott, The Share of Republicans Who Think There’s 
a Lot of Discrimination Is Plummeting, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/08/06/the-number-of-republicans-who-think-theres-a-
lot-of-discrimination-is-plummeting/?utm_term=.6cc52952a465. 
 159. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338 (“The Law School does not . . . limit in any way the broad range of 
qualities and experiences that may be considered valuable contributions to student body diversity.”); Bakke, 438 
U.S. at 315 (“The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of 
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.”). 
Reva Siegel has characterized the equal protection theory underlying these cases as “anti-balkanization,” 
meaning “an emergent independent view more concerned with social cohesion than with colorblindness.” Reva 
B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 
120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1281 (2011). 
 160. As Reva Siegel has suggested, the Court might also improve its decisions’ overall symmetry by 
extending Bakke’s “anti-balkanization” understanding beyond affirmative action to certain police practices that 
aggrieve minority communities. Siegel, supra note 159, at 1360–65. 
 161. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2217 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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reflection of their own. It might thus stand a chance of defusing partisan conflicts 
instead of exacerbating them, thereby averting a destructive downward spiral in 
which counter-majoritarian protections against discrimination become more 
controversial than they should be. At the least, symmetric constitutionalism 
should compel judges to consider these potential benefits before changing 
course. 
4.  Second Amendment Rights 
If symmetric constitutionalism largely favors the status quo in the 
examples addressed so far, it provides critical purchase on a fourth area of 
doctrine: the newly invigorated Second Amendment right to bear arms. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller162 
interpreting the Second Amendment to protect a judicially enforceable 
individual right to bear arms offers a paradigm of constitutional asymmetry. The 
Court reached its result based on the Second Amendment’s putative original 
meaning, even though this history is contested and the Amendment’s cryptic text 
associates “the right to keep and bear arms” with service in a “well-regulated 
militia.”163 The decision thus required throwing Thayerian restraint out the 
window. It disrupted seemingly settled constitutional understandings and cast 
doubt on a huge variety of democratically enacted laws based on manifestly 
contestable constitutional grounds.164 
More to the point here, however, the decision’s partisan and ideological 
valence was unmistakable. Gun control is one of the country’s most divisive 
issues. Although most progressives (and indeed most voters) support stricter gun 
control, the National Rifle Association and the gun rights constituency it 
represents align strongly with the Republican Party and exercise their political 
power to block gun restrictions wherever possible.165 By taking sides in this 
controversy, the Supreme Court aligned itself with one side of the debate, 
legitimating its constitutional view and empowering it to challenge all new gun 
restrictions in litigation. 
In doing so, moreover, the Court elevated an already-fraught policy debate 
to the level of constitutional principle, thus complicating any effort at legislative 
compromise. Heller, indeed, has drawn gun control advocates’ ire onto the Court 
itself, damaging the Court’s own reputation for neutrality and thus its bipartisan 
legitimacy. To be sure, ruling the other way and rejecting the rights claim in 
Heller would have meant taking sides too. Yet doing so in this instance would 
 
 162. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 163. Id. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 164. Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, a rare across-the-board Thayerian, complained: “Each of the points on 
which the two sides take issue [in Heller] ends inconclusively. It is hard to look at all this evidence and come 
away thinking that one side is clearly right on the law.” J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the 
Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 271 (2009). 
 165. See, e.g., Reid J. Epstein, For Democrats, Guns Are New Litmus Test, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2018, at 
A1. 
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have simply left the law as it stood and thus left the scope of gun rights to 
political debate, an arena in which gun rights advocates already held 
considerable power to defend their interests. If nothing else, then, Heller 
illustrates the perils of asymmetric constitutional rulings in a divided polity. 
In fairness, of course, just as some liberals (or others) might object that 
allowing broader affirmative action is asymmetric but constitutionally correct, 
so too might some conservatives complain that Heller was entirely justified, its 
political asymmetry notwithstanding. As always, symmetric constitutionalism 
need not require a particular result when strong enough primary interpretive 
commitments dictate otherwise. But even if Heller’s outcome was adequately 
justified, symmetric constitutionalism offers useful critical perspective on the 
decision’s rhetoric and reasoning. 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, for example, might have mitigated the 
decision’s one-sidedness by highlighting more progressive results supported in 
other areas by the same forms of reasoning (including some of his own decisions 
expanding rights of criminal defendants). By way of illustration, Ninth Circuit 
dissenters in a predecessor case more expressly advocated judicial protection of 
Second Amendment rights based on existing doctrine’s robust protection of 
other constitutional guarantees.166 Reflecting on the majority’s argument that the 
Second Amendment established only a collective right because it was a “right 
of the people,” Judge Kleinfeld observed: 
I cannot imagine the judges on the panel similarly repealing the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection of the right of “the people” to be secure against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, or the right of “the people” to freedom of 
assembly, but times and personnel change, so that this right and all the other 
rights of “the people” are jeopardized by planting this weed in our Constitutional 
garden.167  
This type of rhetoric—justifying an asymmetric result by highlighting its affinity 
to others with differing ideological valence—is not presently conventional, but 
such forms of argument might help soften a divisive decision’s sting by calling 
attention back to shared cross-partisan commitments.168 
Symmetric constitutionalism might also usefully discipline the Heller 
right’s further doctrinal elaboration. For one thing, disfavoring asymmetry might 
discourage giving the Heller right broad scope. Heller itself recognized a 
number of limitations and exceptions, and lower courts to date have generally 
 
 166. Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 572 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing 
en banc). 
 167. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 168. Justice Scalia’s Heller opinion did gesture in this direction in a passage comparing the Second 
Amendment to the First, but he could have made the point more generally and forcefully. See Heller, 554 U.S. 
at 635 (“The First Amendment contains the freedom-of-speech guarantee that the people ratified . . . . The 
Second Amendment is no different.”). 
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given the decision little concrete effect.169 At the same time, to the extent the 
Court does elaborate upon Heller, the Justices might take care to seek ways of 
doing so that resonate with progressive causes, such as concerns about racial 
bias in law enforcement and criminal justice.170 At the least, having defied 
symmetric constitutionalism to recognize an individual right to bear arms in the 
first place, the Court should now ensure that the right itself at least applies even-
handedly without regard to individuals’ demographic and ideological affiliations 
within our fractured society. 
5.  Substantive Due Process 
A last example to consider is substantive due process, the recognition of 
unspecified constitutional rights through judicial interpretation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses. Because of its textually 
ungrounded character, this legal theory—which today supports constitutional 
rights to contraception, abortion, and same-sex marriage, as well as rights to 
religious education and parental autonomy, among other things—is highly 
susceptible to asymmetry. At the least, substantive due process decisions have 
been recurrent political flashpoints. 
From the perspective of symmetric constitutionalism, however, the trouble 
with substantive due process is not so much the doctrine itself, as the absence of 
any clear theory to explain the pattern of case results and enable principled 
identification of additional unenumerated rights. What is more, the doctrine’s 
perceived asymmetry appears partly to reflect a failure of judicial 
communication rather than a problem of substance. Although it certainly tilts 
toward liberal political goals in its most high-profile applications (such as 
abortion and same-sex marriage), current substantive due process doctrine 
overall is more symmetric than the public appears to appreciate. 
Although the modern cases center on identifying a “right to privacy” that 
protects certain intimate and personal life-choices, the Court’s method for giving 
content to this right has meandered from case to case. After claiming to find 
“penumbras” and “emanations” from enumerated rights in its Griswold v. 
Connecticut decision on contraception,171 the Court appeared to focus more on 
medical expertise and interest-balancing in recognizing a right to abortion in Roe 
 
 169. See, e.g., Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (complaining about Court’s inattention to Second Amendment). 
 170. The only Supreme Court decision to date addressing the scope of the right post-Heller is arguably an 
example. In Caetano v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court summarily reversed a Massachusetts Supreme Court 
decision rejecting a domestic violence victim’s argument that the Second Amendment gave her the right, 
notwithstanding state law, to possess a taser (a non-lethal electric stun gun) to defend herself against her prior 
abuser. 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) (per curiam). Even Heller-rejecting progressives might find this right of self-
protection for abuse victims appealing. The Court may further address the scope of Second Amendment rights 
in a case accepted for the October 2019 term. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 883 F.3d 
45 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted sub nom., 139 S. Ct. 939 (2019). 
 171. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
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v. Wade.172 In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, a 
fractured Court reaffirmed Roe’s “core holding” while significantly adjusting its 
scope.173 In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court rejected a right to assisted 
suicide.174 In doing so, the majority embraced an approach focused on 
identifying fundamental societal traditions at a low level of generality,175 but one 
Justice in the majority wrote a concurrence casting doubt on this very method.176 
In its subsequent decisions on same-sex intimacy and marriage, Lawrence v. 
Texas177 and Obergefell v. Hodges178 respectively, the majority abandoned 
Glucksberg’s precise method in favor of an approach that combined appeals to 
positive law and tradition with more open-ended judicial intuition.179 In 
Obergefell, moreover, and to a lesser degree Lawrence, the Court blended 
substantive due process with equal protection concerns. 
To varying degrees, all these outcomes have been politically controversial, 
and some question whether recognizing unspecified constitutional rights at all is 
justified. Holding aside this ultimate question, however, it seems at least possible 
that the Court’s methodological inconsistency has contributed to a sense of 
aggrieved asymmetry among those dissatisfied with particular case results. By 
holding open a path to recognizing other rights with differing political valence 
(or perhaps even adjustment of previously recognized rights by means other than 
court appointments), some clearer method of rights identification might have 
helped distribute substantive due process doctrine’s benefits and thus defused 
some of the controversy surrounding it. In principle, such a method could yield 
a jurisprudence amounting to a relatively symmetric package deal of rights 
protections, as opposed to a menu of asymmetric results, from which judges can 
pick and choose as they like. 
As a matter of fact, furthermore, the overall pattern of decisions is not 
nearly as asymmetric as the public’s predominant focus on abortion and same-
sex marriage suggests. In an earlier era when it also recognized unenumerated 
rights to freedom of contract, the Supreme Court recognized a fundamental 
constitutional right to pursue private religious or foreign-language education for 
 
 172. 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973). 
 173. 505 U.S. 833, 878–79 (1992). 
 174. 521 U.S. 702, 735–36 (1997). 
 175. Id. For an argument that the Fourteenth Amendment is best understood to support recognition of 
unenumerated rights based on convergence among most states’ laws, see CHRISTOPHER R. GREEN, EQUAL 
CITIZENSHIP, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE ORIGINAL SENSE OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES 
CLAUSE (2015). 
 176. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 177. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 178. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 179. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (“The identification and protection of fundamental 
rights . . . . requires courts to exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental 
that the State must accord them its respect. . . . History and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not 
set its outer boundaries.” (citations omitted)). 
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one’s children.180 Never overruled despite the Court’s later repudiation of 
freedom of contract, these decisions have remained key precedents for the entire 
line of modern privacy cases.181 What is more, if rights recognized in Casey, 
Lawrence, and Obergefell hold stronger support among liberals, the right of 
parental control recognized in these cases (and their more recent progeny) is one 
that many Roe-skeptical conservatives have reason to value. Its key effect, after 
all, is to limit governmental interference with private religious education and 
other basic child-rearing choices. From this point of view, the political 
controversy surrounding privacy rights might be another indication that broader 
rather than narrower rationales, and explicit reminders of potential symmetric 
benefits to asymmetric individual cases, might help stabilize civil liberties in a 
polarized era. 
Substantive due process will likely be newly fraught in the post-Kennedy 
era, given Justice Kennedy’s pivotal vote in key substantive due process cases. 
Many either fear or hope that the Court will now embark on a quite different 
course. Whether or not it does so, the Court should attend to the value of 
symmetric constitutionalism in this area, as in others. Without speculating in any 
way about what the Court may do, a redesigned substantive due process doctrine 
that abandoned Casey while proceeding to preserve or expand one-sided 
conservative rights would push hard on the country’s political divides, raising 
precisely the legitimacy challenges that symmetric constitutionalism seeks to 
mitigate. 
CONCLUSION 
Americans are sharply polarized over questions of substantive policy, and 
these divisions have increasingly manifested themselves in public-law litigation 
and competing visions of constitutional law. We risk entering a period of no-
holds-barred competition between rival constitutional visions—one centered on 
ever-more expansive conceptions of equality and personal autonomy, the other 
on ever-more expansive notions of religious freedom and economic liberty. Yet 
there is another path. A rival ethos, with deep roots in our constitutional 
tradition, competes for attention. Instead of seeking advantage for one side or 
the other in our intense political divides, judges could strive, when possible, to 
tilt towards conceptions of civil liberty that confer benefits across major social 
and political divides, thus avoiding zero-sum tradeoffs between rights and 
encouraging each side to view the other’s freedoms as a reflection of its own. 
This ethos could provide a distinctive form of judicial restraint for our 
polarized era—a model in which judges play a robust role in policing 
constitutional boundaries on government action, but do so in a manner that 
 
 180. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 
(1977) (plurality opinion). 
 181. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (citing Pierce and Meyer). 
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activates mutually-reinforcing constitutional commitments instead of downward 
spirals of tit-for-tat erosion. On this model, instead of drawing ire from one side 
or the other by seeking resolution of political disputes by constitutional means, 
judges might diffuse controversies over courts’ constitutional role by 
encouraging both sides to see political benefit in sustaining key legal 
understandings. 
As I have noted repeatedly, symmetric constitutionalism cannot be the 
overriding feature of constitutional interpretation. The Constitution is not neutral 
across all conceivable ideological divides, and judges need not fully subordinate 
their primary interpretive commitments to advancing symmetry. Nevertheless, 
this ethos does provide valuable fresh perspective not only on the Supreme 
Court’s recently concluded term, but also on some of the most heated 
controversies in contemporary constitutional law, including free speech, 
structural interpretation, equal protection, the Second Amendment, and 
substantive due process. 
As in past periods of intense polarization, judges face a choice. They can 
mortgage their credibility to advance their partisan faction’s legal goals, or they 
can craft constitutional doctrines with sufficiently broad benefits to stand a 
chance of becoming self-sustaining. The latter course, I have argued, better 
accords with the logic of judicial review and the judicial role, it reflects a long 
tradition of civic republicanism and constitutional liberty under law, and it holds 
at least some potential to diffuse key current controversies instead of 
exacerbating them. For all these reasons, and for the sake of both civil liberty 
and political stability, judges (though not only them) should be willing to 
disappoint their partisan faction and attend to the better angels of their nature, as 
a great American in another polarized era once urged. 
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